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VINTRODUCTION
This study traces the development of Philippine-USSR relations and 
examines the implications of such development for Philippine national 
security, in particular, and the regional security of Southeast Asia in 
general. At a glance, this is a problem for history and not for 
international relations. However, national and regional security 
problems in Southeast Asia are closely tied with the historical 
development of each nation's relations with external powers, 
particularly the United States and Soviet Union. Any assessment of 
different national threat perceptions and their policy implications for 
national or regional security can be misleading if not viewed within 
the perpective of historical developments.
This is particularly true with respect to the Philippines. The 
country has never been isolated from regional events nor from the 
influence of international powers. Its security options reflect this 
relationship. First, it was closely allied with the United States (as 
it still is), being a US colony since the turn of this century up to 
1946 when the country got its political independence. Second, while 
politically independent, the Philippines has been economically 
dependent. Third, as a result of this dependency, Philippine foreign 
policy up to 1968 was closely tied with the American foreign policy. 
Fourth, with worldwide economic recession, following the oil embargo of 
1973, the country was forced to open trade and diplomatic relations 
with other countries, particularly with the socialist and communist 
bloc. And fifth, the Philippines established diplomatic ties with the
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USSR in 1976, apparently to ensure trade and commercial markets outside 
of the traditional US and Japan markets.
These developments have somehow affected Philippine-US relations. 
In recent years, there have been increasing demands for the removal of 
American bases from the country. The 1947 Military Bases Agreement was 
amended in 1979, recognizing the sovereignty of Philippine government 
over the bases. It also provided for the payment of "rent" for bases 
during the years that these are occupied by American troops, perhaps 
until 1991 when the terms of lease expire. Recently, the rent problem 
surfaced to become one of the irritants in the relations between the 
Philippines and the United States.
Meanwhile, the USSR has managed to keep its posture at a low-key 
level, maintained in the context of what the new Soviet leader, Mikhail 
Gorbachev said, "the continuing policy of equality, mutual respect, and 
non-intervention in the internal affairs" of the Philippines. It has, 
however, strengthened its Philippine relations through increased 
economic, trade, and cultural cooperation. Other diplomatic 
initiatives include several project proposals intended to expand its 
scientific and technological participation in Philippine development 
programs.
The objectives of this study are threefold: (1) to trace the 
development of Philippine-USSR relations, (2) to analyse these 
relations in the context of the current national security options, and 
(3) to examine the implications of this relationship for regional 
security and policy direction.
Like its Southeast Asian neighbors, the Philippines occupies a 
strategic place in the geopolitical confrontations of the superpowers 
in Asia and the Pacific, particularly that of the United States and the 
Soviet Union. It is virtually at the middle of the "collision" and this 
makes it difficult for the country to disengage itself from any
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development in the region, present or future. There is no doubt that 
the Philippine internal stability and security is largely dependent 
upon the range, limit and direction of US-USSR power relations in the 
region.
First, the Philippines is traditionally identified with the United 
States, being its former colony. Second, the two largest US military 
bases outside of the United States are found in the Philippines. Third, 
the Philippines has expanded its relations with the Soviet Union —  
from friendship and cultural exchanges to trade agreements and 
technical assistance. Fourth, the country has likewise intensified its 
ties with the People's Republic of China and has joint ventures with 
Japan in various development projects. And fifth, it is an active 
member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Examined against this background, the Philippines is critical to 
both the United States and the Soviet Union's interests in Southeast 
Asia. It is straddled between the Pacific and the South China Sea, 
thereby providing whichever power it is allied to with military and 
commercial advantages in the region. For the US, the Philippines is the 
seat of its traditional naval and air supremacy in the South China Sea 
and its control of access into the Indian Ocean, via the Strait of 
Malacca. On the basis of this, the Philippines has to be kept within 
the US realm of influence. For its part, the Soviet Union has 
maintained a low posture but has pursued consistent propaganda 
campaigns. Local situations are certainly monitored. Soviet diplomats 
are actively participating in local academic symposia and conferences. 
Moreover, there has been a steady flow of Russian visitors to Manila, 
representing various organizations.
Philippine-USSR relations may have beneficial and/or adverse 
effects on the stability and security not only of the Philippines but 
also of the ASEAN region. First, should the USSR succeed in exploiting
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local developments (i.e.f economic crises and political problems) in 
the country and coursing these to its favor, it would gain great 
psychological advantage by making a major dent in the American bastion 
of power and influence in Asia and the Pacific. Second, should the 
USSR gain an upper hand in influence, it could be in a position to 
exert political pressures on the Philippines to do its bidding —  that 
is, to diminish and ultimately remove the US military presence in the 
islands. And fourth, should these possibilities become real, then the 
USSR would have attained a capability to control the important shipping 
lanes from the straits of Malacca to the Sea of Japan and to challenge 
the maritime approaches to Australia and New Zealand.
On the basis of the above discussion, it may be hypothesized that:
1. Philippine-USSR relations pose a challenge to national and 
regional security in the area of Southeast Asia;
2. This being the case, the stability, security and development
of any Southeast Asian country, particularly the
Philippines, will be affected.
The method used for this study is historical and political. The 
data are gathered from primary documents like diplomatic communiques, 
speeches, memoranda, and agreements. Secondary sources include 
published documents, articles, opinions and news about the development 
of Philippine-USSR relations.
Some difficulties encountered in gathering data have to be 
mentioned as part of the limitation of this study. Because of the 
current situation in the Philippines, Filipino and Soviet diplomats 
were, at the time of interviews (January-February, 1985), non-committal 
on many vital issues affecting RP-USSR relations and, more importantly, 
primary documents were only selectively made available. Thus, press 
releases Issued by the two countries and published in the local and 
foreign newspapers, have been relied on as the main source of 
"detailed" information.
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The data are organized in the following format: Chapter I traces 
the historical development of Philippine-USSR relations. Chapter II 
discusses the period from 1968 to 1976 when full-scale trade began and 
led to the opening of formal diplomatic relations between the 
Philippines and the Soviet Union in 1976. Chapter III focuses attention 
on the trends of Philippine-USSR relations after the opening of 
diplomatic relations, from 1976 to 1985. Chapter IV presents a summary 
and conclusions and also discusses the implications of RP-USSR 
relations for national security.
1CHAPTER 1
PHILIPPINE-USSR RELATIONS: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the historical development 
of the relations between the Philippines and Russia - the USSR, 
including their early contacts, to place in proper perspective the 
significance the Russians had given the archipelago long before their 
present geopolitical interests in the region of Southeast Asia had been 
clearly defined. These early attempts at diplomatic initiatives had not 
been given much attention by students of Asian and Southeast Asian 
affairs. However, as historical records show, the Russians were, in 
the past as in contemporary times, acutely interested if not directly 
involved in Asian and Southeast Asian affairs. In fact, they had 
attempted to open diplomatic relations with the Philippines in the 
early part of the 19th century.
1.1 Early interests1
Early Russian interests in the Philippines can be traced back to 
the 16th century when Russian intellectuals took note of the discovery 
of the archipelago for the Spanish crown by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521. 
In 1523, an account of Magellan's travels entitled De Moluccis Insulis 
was published in Latin and translated into Russian "presumably between
^Most of the data on the early Russian interests and subsequent 
contact with the Philippines is drawn from the book of A. Olenin and 
V. Makarenko, The USSR-the Philippines: Past and Present. Manila:
Novosti Press Agency, 1982.
2o1526 and 1530." This translation was credited to Dmitry Gerasimov, 
"the ambassador of Grand Prince Basil III Ivanovich of Muscovy 
(1479-1533) to the Papal See in Rome."* 3
Other information about the Philippines came from travellers, 
explorers, and adventurers from other European countries. In the 
latter part of the 17th century, Russia following other countries in 
Europe, "began to make persistent attempts to establish direct contacts 
with countries in the Far East, Southeast Asia, and Oceania"4 to 
enhance trade. The Philippines was included in this expansion of 
Russian interests outside continental Europe. The Russians considered 
the Philippines an important point of reference in understanding 
European colonial power politics in Asia and as entree point to 
possible trade in the region. Thus, they watched local developments 
with keen interest. As Olenin and Makarenko have noted, for example,
... in 1763-1770, the Russian diplomatic service kept a 
close watch on the protracted Anglo-Spanish litigation over 
what was known as the Manila debt, that is, sums, Spain was 
required to pay to the British who captured Manila and part of 
Luzon for a short time in 1762-1764 in the course of the 
Seven-Year War. Later, Russian diplomats were interested in 
the development of Spanish-Dutch trade competition; the Russian 
embassies in Madrid and The Hague closely followed the 
emergence and operations between 1767 and 1797 of the Spanish 
Royal Philippine Company, which had a trade monopoly, and 
examined its influence on the general course of European 
politics.5
However, Russia alone, among the European powers had no trade 
outlets in Southeast Asia, although it had expanded in Siberia and 
Northeast Asia.
oOlenin and Makarenko, ibid., p.5.
3loc.cit.
4ibid. p.6
5ibid.
31.2 Direct contact
By the turn of the 19th century, the Russians took a more vigorous 
step to establish trade links with the rimland countries of Asia and 
the insular Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The trade plan was 
prepared by Nikolai Rezanov (1764-1807).6 789 The plan included 
establishing trade relations with Java and the Philippines. The 
primary motive, however, was to secure the normal functioning of the 
remote Russian settlements outside of continental Europe, particularly 
those in the Far East and Alaska. Rezanov in 1806 sought Spain's 
permission for Russian ships to call at Manila and establish direct 
ties between Russia and the Philippines, but the Spanish authorities 
in Manila refused. In 1812, an American trader, Peter Dobell, 
negotiated with the Russian authorities an agreement to send three 
ships with provisions from Manila to Kamchatka. The following year he 
submitted to the Russian Government a detailed plan to arrange a 
regular food supply for its possessions in the Far East by establishing
Oregular Russo-Philippine trade.
Siberian Governor-general I.B. Pestel and Foreign Minister 
Nesselrode endorsed the proposal and Tsar Alexander I approved it in 
1816. In order to be assured of regular supply, the Russian government 
"decided to set up a Consulate-General in Manila, the first Russian
Qdiplomatic mission in Southeast Asia." Peter Dobell was appointed 
consul-general.
The move, however, suffered a drawback when Spain "refused to give
6Ibid., p.7.
7loc.clt.
8loc.clt.
9V. Makarenko, "A Russian Consulate in Manila" Focus Philippines 
August 24, 1974. Pete Daroy also made mention of Peter Dobell as the 
first Russian Consul in Manila but did not elaborate,"History of 
Philippine-Soviet Friendship I & II, Graphic, 6-7 January 1971.
4official recognition to Russian diplomatic representation in the 
Philippines,"'10 despite the friendship between Ferdinand VII of Spain 
and Alexander I. The Russian Ambassador to Madrid, D.P. Tatischev, 
managed to arrange a compromise, under which Dobell was to be allowed 
to act "as an unofficial representative of the Russian government in 
the archipelago."11 Madrid did not object. Dobell started his duties 
in Manila in March 1820, but after a few months resigned on grounds of 
ill-health. In 1826, the Russian consulate-general in Manila was 
closed. It was not reopened until 1890, and then only at
vice-consulate level with part-time consuls who were foreign, chiefly 
French businessmen. This state of affairs continued until the end of 
1917.
During the 19th century, works written by Russian travellers and 
scholars became the source of information in Russia about the 
Philippines. Notable among these early visitors were V. Golovnin, 
0. Kotsebue, F. Litke, and K. Posyet.12
Another prominent writer who visited the archipelago in 1852 was
Ivan Goncharov who was on his way to Japan. Goncharov devoted a
chapter to the Philippines in his book, From Manila to the Siberian
Coast. These observations were reinforced by the notes of linguists
who noted vocabularies from such Philippine languages as Tagalog,
Cebuano and Maguindanao.^  The Russian anthropologist, Nikolai
Miklukho-Maklai (1846-1888), visited the Philippines twice during his
1 5expeditions to the Papuans in the Bay of Astrolabe in 1873 and 1883.
10loc. c it.
11loc.ci t.
12ibid . p. 10
13ibid . p. 13
14ibid . p. 14
15loc. ci t.
5He took copious notes on Philippine Negritos particularly those in 
Luzon.
During the Philippine revolution of 1896, the Russians had kept a 
watchful eye on the developments in the Philippines. It included 
eye-witness accounts collected by the commanders of the Russian Pacific 
Squadron, reports of vice-consuls in Manila, and information gathered 
by the Russian ambassador in Madrid.
When the Philippine-American war broke out, the Russians 
dispatched A. Edrikhin, a Russian officer, as an observer attached to 
the American forces in the Philippines. Edrikhin wrote a long report 
on the military operations and political events in the Philippines, 
later published as "An Essay on the Events in the Philippines from 1896
1 fito 1901." Other Russian observers of the Philippine-American war 
included a prominent Russian artist Vassili Vereshchagin (1842-1904) 
who went to the Philippines after the American forces had landed there. 
Journalists from such literary magazines as Mir Bozhy (God's World) 
also came and published articles on Philippine revolution and 
American-Philippine war.
1.3 Early Filipino visitors
When the Americans took over the Philippines, the Russians were 
deprived of the possibility of establishing diplomatic ties. For a 
while, the Russians did not make any move to establish any link with 
local leaders. Russia was too busy with the Russo-Japanese war 
(1904-1905), the First World War (1914-1918) and the Socialist 
Revolution in 1917. However, during the interim years of peace, Russia 
managed to attract the attention of Filipino leaders.
In 1908, Manuel L. Quezon, then speaker of the Philippine
16i b i d .
6Assembly, was appointed by the US government as Philippine delegate to
the International Congress on Navigation in St. Petersburg. He was
accompanied by Teodoro M. Kalaw and F. Theo Rogers of the Philippine 
17Free Press. The delegation went by way of Japan and the
Trans-Siberian railway, to find on arrival that the Congress had ended
the week before. Thus, they spent most of their time "doing the rounds
of Moscow and St. Petersburg. We attended sessions of the Duma, we
admired the grandeur of the buildings, the wealth of the museums; we
entered the churches; we prostrated ourselves before the icons; we
1 ftsympathised with the mu.1 iks.
On their return, Kalaw wrote a book entitled Hacia la Tierra del 
Tsar (Towards the Land of the Czar).19 His descriptions of Russia, its 
people and culture, were greatly appreciated by local and foreign 
critics. W.E. Retana, a famous Spanish writer, gave the book glowing 
praise in Madrid. The book was a lengthy account of Russia brought to 
the attention of Filipinos —  the intellectuals, academicians and the 
reading public.
1.4 Linkages through the Labor Movements
Russian interest in the Philippines was rekindled after the 1917
Socialist Revolution. The Soviet leaders adopted a "Decree on Peace on
8 November (26 October, Old Style) 1917" during the Second All-Russia
Congress which encouraged and supported the war for national liberation
against colonialism, and denounced the annexation of foreign territory 
20in any form. The American annexation of the Philippines in 1898 was
1 7Teodoro M. Kalaw, Aide-de-Camp to Freedom. Manila: Teodoro
M. Kalaw Society, Inc., 1965,p.42. See also Pete Daroy, "History of
Philippine-Soviet Friendship" Graphic January 6, 1971.
18Kalaw op.cit.,p. 64.
19ibid.p.65-66.
20Olenin and Makarenko op. cit.p. 24.
7not spared from Russian criticism. In fact, Lenin, in his "Letter to 
the American Workers" made a rather virulent statement against the 
Americans for their decision to colonize the Philippines:
The American people, who set the world an example in waging 
a revolutionary war against feudal slavery, now find themselves 
in the latest, a capitalist stage of wage-slavery to a handful 
of multimillionaires, and find themselves playing the role of 
hired thugs who, for the benefit of the wealthy scoundrels, 
throttled the Philippines in 1898 on the pretext of liberating 
them.21
These views continue to underlie Russian interests in the
Philippines. Now politically cut-off, new avenues to assert influence
and spread the Marxist-Leninist ideology had to be found. The emerging
labor movements were the convenient take-off point. Although the issue
22of "direct influence" is still an unresolved and controversial one, 
it is however historically clear that contacts between Soviet Union and 
Manila were through the labor leaders who trained in Moscow and came 
back to propagate the Marxist-Leninist ideals among the working class. 
As former Huk commander, Alfredo Saulo commented: "Communism cannot
thrive without an organized labor movement. It is the mass of
wage-earners that provide the base of operation and motive power for 
this ideology."23
The initial encounter of Filipino trade union leaders with the 
ideals of communism was through the American Federation of Labor in 
1919. During this time, Crisanto Evangelista, then a prominent figure
21V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol.2 (revised edition) Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 705.p pSee Francisco Nemenzo, "An Irrepressible Revolution: The Decline
and Resurgence of the Philippine Communist Movement."(typescript,1965); 
see also Francisco Nemenzo, "Rectification Process in the Philippine 
Communist Movement," in Lim Joo-Jock and Van! S. (eds.), Armed 
Communist Movement in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1984.
23Alfredo Saulo, Communism in the Philippines: An Introduction.
Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1969, p.6.
8in the labor movement, was appointed by the Philippine Assembly as a 
member of the first Philippine Independence mission. While in the US, 
he contacted leftist elements in the American labor unions and returned 
to the Philippines, apparently with ideas about Marxism which he 
nurtured with great zeal to become "the father of Philippine 
communism.1,24
But even before this international connection, the labor unions
had already been active and the mass actions which they took against
unjust labor practices in both private and government institutions had
provided the proper environment for communism to be accepted with ease.
This condition was reinforced by Filipino nationalism which burst into
open revolution against Spain and resistance against the Americans.
Thus, it does not require a thorough understanding of the theories of
communism to respond to Lenin's invitation, during the First Congress
2 Sof the Comintern, to join him in the "national liberation" movement.
In the past, labor had no voice at all. The Spaniards suppressed 
all kinds of protest and the leaders were arrested. Similarly, during 
the US administration, all organizations subverting US policy in the 
Philippines were held suspect. The US Congress enacted an act, ACT 
292, known as the Treason and Sedition Law (1901).26 In spite of this 
prohibition, the Filipino laborers continued their fight. They were 
undaunted.
24Saulo, ibid. p. 12.
25Olenin and Makarenko, op.cit. pp.24-27.
2®US Congress ACT 292 (1901). Section 10 of this Act states: "Until
it has been officially proclaimed that a state of war or insurrection 
against the authority or sovereignty of the United States no longer 
exists in the Philippine Islands, it shall be unlawful for any person 
to advocate, orally or by writing, or printing, or like methods the 
independence of the Philippine Islands or their separation from the 
United States, whether by peaceful or forcible means, or to print, 
publish, or circulate any handbill, newspaper or other publications 
advocating such independence or separation. Any person violating the 
provisions of this Section shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding 
two thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding one year.
9Two important events took place in the Philippine labor movement 
between 1910 and 1919. One was the holding of the Congreso de Obrero
P7Fillpinas on 1 May 1913. The other was the founding in 1919 of the
O Qfirst peasant labor movement called Union de Aparceros de Fillpinas. 
This movement became the basis for the communist activity among the 
peasants especially in the central provinces of Luzon. It had a 
continuous existence until it merged its activities with the Huks in 
1942.29
Because of his role in labor unions, Evangelista was later
"designated labor representative in the first Philippine Independence
30Mission to the United States headed by Senate President Quezon." His
assignment was to get in touch with Filipino workers in the US and also
with the US labor unions to enlist their support and assistance in the
fight for Philippine independence.
Evangelista did a marvelous job. But he was disgruntled over the
behaviour of other Filipino delegates "who treated the mission as a
31junket instead of a task of great responsibility." He was able to
meet American Union leaders, especially the "leftist groups", and
32"consequently returned to the Philippines a confirmed Marxist." With 
his deep socialist and nationalist sentiments, Evangelista paved the 
way, with the help of his fellow union leaders, for the transformation 
of the labor unions into a more radical political party —  the Partido 
Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) in 1930.
In 1924, an American labor leader, apparently one of those whom
27Kurihara, op. cit. p. 61.
28Ibid., p. 62.
29Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1955, p. 10.
30Saulo, op. cit. p. 10.
31loc. cit.
32Ibid.
10
Evangelista met, named Harrison George alias William Janequette, came
to Manila and invited the Philippine labor union leaders to attend the
Pacific (Oriental) Transport Workers' Conference scheduled in June of
33the same year in Canton, China.
Accepting George's invitation, five delegates were chosen from
prominent labor union leaders to represent the country in the Canton 
34conference. Whether or not the Filipino delegates knew the precise
nature of the conference, it was nevertheless the first communist- 
sponsored activity they ever attended. In the conference they met with 
other communist delegates. It was possible that the conference had an 
impact upon the Filipino representatives because "on their return, they 
organized a secretariat in Manila under the direction of the Third
qcInternational of Moscow." In fact, their names "were submitted to 
the chief of the Profintern (Red Labor International) in Moscow" and 
were apparently spotted as the most likely agents because "some years 
later, they were to receive communist publications from the Soviet 
capital regularly."36
37Harrison George came back to the Philippines in 1927. He
renewed acquaintance with Filipino labor leaders whom he met earlier 
and encouraged them to affiliate with Pan Pacific Trade Union (PPTU) 
Secretariat, then the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern (Communist
O  OInternational), based in Hankow, China. This encouragement was
timely because when the delegates from the Canton conference came back, 
they held a convention where the topic of communism was intensely
33Scaff, op. clt.p. 7.
34Ibid. p. 13. See also Gregorio Zaide, The Pageant of Philippine 
History, vol. II. Manila: Philippine Education Company, 1979, p. 393.
35Scaff, op. cit.p. 7.
36Saulo, op. cit. p. 13.
37Saulo, op.cit.p.15.
38Ibid. p. 98.
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debated and the idea of affiliating with the PPTU was presented and 
favorably endorsed. The affiliation of the Congreso Obrero de 
Filipinas was formalised on 30 June 1927, after George's visit to 
Manila.39
George's visit was followed by that of Earl Browder, alias Earl 
Morrison, chief secretary of the PPTU. He met with the labor leaders 
and one of the significant results was the decision of the Congreso 
Obrero de Filipinas to send a delegation to the Profintern conference 
in Moscow in March 1928. When the delegation returned, Evangelista 
organized several groups of Filipino laborers "as pensionados to study 
in Moscow's University of Toilers of the East."40
The ground was thus paved for the wider dissemination of Russian 
communism in the Philippines. The "university" was actually "a 
secondary school" designed for the training of cadres in Asia and the
Far East.41 For much higher level of training, a collegiate one, the
42students were sent to the Lenin school. None of the early Filipino
43trainees ever reached the Lenin school. This was primarily because 
most of the labor leaders rose from the ranks and their assumption to 
leadership was more of personal charisma than academic preparation.
These pensionados were supported financially by the local 
Communist Party and by the Communist Party of the United States. It was 
then the policy of the Comintern that the Communist Party of the 
"mother country" assist the movement in the colony. When the first 
group left, they passed by Shanghai where they were briefed on their
39Ibid. p. 15. 
40loc. cit. 
41loc. cit. 
42Ibid.
43Ibid.
12
mission and were given money for their expenses.44 The second batch of 
labor pensionados was sent in 1929, and the third, in 1930.
The batch of the 1934 Moscow trainees was considered to be the
most significant group because two of them became members of the
Politburo while one is elected to the central commmittee of the
Communist Party of the Philippines. They were likewise honored with 
the "rare privilege" of being invited as observers to the historic 
Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in Moscow in 1935. The last 
group of labor leaders sent to train in Moscow was in 1935.
1.5 Ideological links
After the outlawing of the Communist Party in 1932 and the
imprisonment of most of its leaders, the local communists found it 
difficult to continue their direct link with Moscow. The Russians also 
did not make concerted efforts to encourage the relationship and even 
the scholarship program was allowed to "die a natural death." Two 
possible reasons may be suggested as underlying this phenomenon. 
First, there was a growing anti-communist sentiment in the United
States and in the Philippines which, if provoked further, could
jeopardize the proselytizing activities of the labor unions. And
second, the Russians were faced with an impending threat of war with 
Germany.
There was no doubt that the influence of communism on Filipino
A ^
labor union leaders was deep. It constituted the driving force of
labor demonstrations and strikes not only in the Manila area but also
44Ibid p. 67.
45loc. cit.
46Cf. Zaide, op. cit. p. 394; Scaff, op. cit. 
cit. p. Iff; Saulo, op. cit. p. Iff.
p. 12.; Nemenzo, op.
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47in the provinces. These protests were addressed to the sufferings of
the Filipino laborers and farmers and therefore fitted into the mould
of the emerging Filipino nationalism and to the demands for political
independence from the Americans. The emotional intensity for
independence was summed up by the statement of Commonwealth President
Quezon: "I would rather have the Philippines run like hell by
48Filipinos than like heaven by the Americans".
To dramatize the labor unions' pro-Russian communist position, the
launching of the Communist Party in 1930 was made to coincide with the
4913th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. In fact,
during this occasion, Evangelista read the Communist Party constitution 
and after having done so, also extolled openly "the advantages of the 
Russian Government and the means which had been employed by the 
laboring class of Russia to establish its present government, citing 
certain insurgent colonies of different nations as examples".50
In the same meeting, Dominador Ambrosio, another labor leader, 
read an extract from the constitution of the Communist Party:
The Philippines as a subject nation, in order to establish 
an independent government has to revolt under the leadership of 
the laborers ... We need a Communist Party, one that is not 
reformist but revolutionary. Only by revolutionary means can 
we demolish the slavery of of one man by another and of one 
nation by another nation ... the principal ideal of the 
Communist Party in the desire to head the Philippine Government 
is different from that of the burgess [bourgeois] political 
parties. Its aim is not to strengthen the capitalist 
government but to engender —  as it cannot be avoided —  the
47 Zaide, op , cit. , p. 392; Saulo, op. cit. , p. 6ff
48A popular quote attributed to President Quezon, allegedly during 
his fight for Philippine independence but has not been properly 
recorded in history books.
49Scaff, op. cit., p. 11 
50Report of Cases Determined in the Supreme Court of the Philippine 
Islands. Philippine Reports. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1935. vol. 
57, p. 236.
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war of the classes and to bring its downfall. 51
Similarly, in a manifesto distributed by the Katipunan ng mga Anak 
Pawis sa Pilipinas, it was argued that
Due to the success of Soviet Russia, revolutions were 
incited in the whole world . . . The idea of revolution spreads 
itself, struggles become more and more serious but the labor 
movement continues on the path travelled by the Russian 
laborers —  the Bolsheviks. What is the path? The seizure of 
the power of the government from the hands of the burgess and 
the establishment of a government by the laborers.52
The Communist Party published and circulated a party paper called
Titis (Flame), operated a bookstore in Quiapo, Manila, where communist
materials published in the United States and Russia were openly sold,
and to top it all, publicly displayed "its red flag with the hammer and 
53sickle emblem". This created public furor and provoked government
reaction against the Party. The authorities kept watched over the
activities of the union leaders affiliated with it. They also made it
difficult for the Party or its member-union to secure permits to hold
rallies. Union and Party activities were not viewed as legitimate
labor protests but as agitations aimed at creating public disturbance
and at challenging the government.
When the Communist Party was suppressed, another labor
organization emerged, the Socialist Party, headed by Pedro Abad 
54Santos. The organization expanded very rapidly after 1932 and it
included among its members, Luis Taruc who was to play a major role in
Pv Fvthe peasant revolt in the 1950s. The Socialist Party was said to have 
been organized in 1929 but it did not become a radical organization to 
reckon with until the mid-1930s.
51Ibid., p. 237.
52Ibid. p. 373.
33Saulo, op. clt. p. 12.
54Saulo, op. cit., p. 33ff.
55Ibid., p. 16.
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Since the Socialist Party appeared to be relatively acceptable to
the government, due mainly to the fact that its aims "supported"
President Quezon's social justice program, the Communist Party agreed
56to maintain a modus vivendi with it. As Jose Lava, the Communist 
Party historian, later on wrote
The exploited peasants and workers did not take such action 
(the outlawing of the Communist Party) lying down. The 
Communist Party of the Philippines went underground and 
directed the legal struggle of the masses of peasants and 
workers from the underground. At the same time, Comrade Pedro 
Abad Santos organized the Socialist Party of the Philippines in 
1932 to carry on the legal struggle of the exploited masses 
which the Communist Party of the Philippines can not do very 
effectively because of the outlawing . . . the name "socialist" 
was adopted as a mere tactical maneuver to premit legal 
existence at a time when the Communist was outlawed...
The actual merge of the two organization took place in 1938. 
Historians record that the "ironing out of differences" and the 
settlement of these were largely due to the efforts of James S. Allen, 
alias Dr. Sol Auerback, of the Communist Party of the United States 
(CPUSA).58 The "merged" organization was called Communist Party of the 
Philippines and it was publicly launched at the Grand Opera House in 
Manila on 29-31 October 1938.
Evangelista did not attend the convention because, immediately
upon his release from prison that year (1938), he proceeded to Moscow 
59for medical care. He was assisted by the CPUSA who also worked for 
his pardon. Earl Browder, secretary-general of the CPUSA, sent his
56Pedro Abad Santos, however, opposed Quezon's social justice 
program, saying: "We do not believe in social justice. We do not
invoke social justice. We believe that if the masses have to be saved 
it is by their own efforts; to organize, to unite, and their only 
weapon is —  strike!". Ibid.
57Jose Lava, "Twenty Years of Struggle of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines". Typescript (no date), p. 3.
58Saulo, op. cit. p. 33.
59Ibid., pp. 34-35.
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fingreetings to the convention, while James Allen gave a stirring talk.
There were a total of two hundred seventy-two delegates who attended
fi 1the convention, including thirty-five women.
The new Party was more communist than socialist. The preamble of 
its constitution reads:
The Communist Party of the Philippines (Merger of 
Socialist-Communist Parties) is the political party of the 
Filipino working classes based on the principles of scientific 
Communism and Marxism-Leninism. It fights for the immediate and 
basic wants of the workers, peasants and all elements exploited 
by capitalists. As the vanguard of the working classes, it 
stands in the forefront of this struggle.
The Communist Party will fight for the democratic right won 
by the Filipino people and will defend them against enemies 
desiring to crush democracy and all national freedoms. The 
Party leads the struggle against imperialism, exploitation of 
colonial and semi-colonial countries, division of classes and 
nations, and all forms of chauvinism.2
The Communist Party of the Philippines played an important role 
during the Second World War. It organized an anti-Japanese army called 
Hukbo Laban sa Hapon (HUK). After the war, the Huk movement figured 
prominently in communist rebellion which nearly toppled the central 
Philippine government in 1949-50, until President Magsaysay broke its 
ideological and military backbone.
A lengthy discussion was devoted to this indirect link with the 
USSR because the HUK campaigns in the 1950s had created a strong 
anti-USSR feelings and therefore affected the early establishment of 
formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. It was against 
this anti-communist attitude, plus the fact that Philippine foreign
60loc. cit.
61loc. cit.
62Constitution of the Communist Party of the Philippines, 1930; 
(translation, 1946), p.l.
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policy was structured and tied to American foreign policy from 1946 to 
1968, that the Soviets did not press for early relations and the 
Philippines maintained a belligerent attitude towards the Russians. In 
fact, Filipino nationals were not permitted to visit communist 
countries. Stamped on the first page of every passport during the 
period prior to 1968 was the following warning:
This passport is not valid for travel to the following 
countries: Russia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, 
Bulgaria, and the communist controlled territories of China,^  O
Germany, Korea, and Vietnam.
Visiting any of these countries was enough for one to be suspected 
as a communist and, for whatever reasons the authorities could think 
of, like possessing a copy of communist literature, to be charged with 
subversion, sedition, and treason. This condition persisted eighteen 
years and held back the decision to have diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union.
63Stamped on page 1 of all Philippine passports from 1946 to 1968.
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CHAPTER 2
OVERTURES TO FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
As stated in the preceding chapter, Philippine-Soviet diplomatic 
relations were stalemated for almost four decades after the outlawing 
of the Communist Party of the Philippines in 1932 and the outbreak of 
the Second World War in 1941. The reasons for this delay were 
numerous. The fundamental ones were: (1) refusal of the Soviet Union 
to recognize Philippine independence after it was granted by the United 
States in 1946;1 (2) the close alignment of Philippine foreign policy 
with that of the United States;3 (3) the Cold War which characterized 
the relations between the communist bloc countries led by the Soviet 
Union and the "Free World" bloc led by the United States;3 and (4) the 
peasant revolt led by the HUK (Hukbo Laban sa Hapon), the military arm 
of the underground Communist Party of the Philippines.4
These factors stood as "formidable psychological and political
^Manuel Collantes, "The Establishment of Relations between the 
Philippines and the Soviet Union" Fookien Times Yearbook, 1976, p.34.pAlejandro Fernandez, The Philippines and the United States: the 
Forging of the New Relations Quezon City: University of the Philippines 
Press, 1977, pp.54ff. Also Claud Buss, The United States and the 
Philippines: Background for Policy. Washington DC, 1977.
3This was in line with the US containment policy on China in the 
1950s. The Philippines was pressured by the US to distance itself from 
China which was then considered a menace to peace and tranquility in 
Southeast Asia.
4Cf. Eduardo Lachica, HUK: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt. 
Manila: Solidaridad Publishing, 1971; Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk 
Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines. Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1977.
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barriers to normal relations with the Russians.' In addition, the US, 
as Quid pro quo to the granting of independence, established two big 
military bases in the Philippines and signed long-range military 
agreements with the Philippine government in 1942. These two 
additional factors intended to protect American security interests in 
Southeast Asia, prevented the Philippines from taking steps to 
normalize its relations with the USSR and other communist countries. 
On the other hand, from 1947 onwards the US and Filipino leaders
Ounleashed a whole range of anti-communist propaganda —  from the hall 
of the United Nations to the remotest Philippine village —  depicting 
the communists as agitators, saboteurs, and subversives out to subvert 
freedom and topple the existing government.
The campaign was so successful that by the time the Soviets were 
ready to recognize the Philippines as an independent country, the 
people were wary about any move towards establishing diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union. Many leaders believed that "nothing 
particularly worthwhile would be gained by opening ties with Moscow —  
and opening the Philippines to Russian traders and financiers at the 
same time that we open our gates to spies, agitators, and subversive 
agents."0 Supporting this attitude was the prevailing orientation in 
the diplomatic circle that diplomatic ties "should be reserved only for 
friends and allies and should be denied those countries considered as 
adversaries."* 6710 Thus, the view was that the Soviets were not friends
Collantes, op.cit. p.34.
6See A. Olenin and V. Makarenko, The USSR-the Philippines: Past and
Present, Manila: Navosti Press Agency, 1982.7Fernandez, op.cit., p.55ff.
O Ernesto Macatuno, "Paving the Way for the Russians" Sunday Times 
Magazine (10 January 1971), p. 11.
Q Ben Javier, "A Christmas Package from Russia" (Voices of Dissent), 
Examiner (19-26 December 1970), p.50.
10Collantes, op.cit., p.34.
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because they refused to recognize the independence of the Philippines; 
they were not friends because they were, above all, communists.
The consensus therefore during the period from 1946 to 1976 was to 
have no relations with the Soviet Union. Communism was opium to 
Filipino religious faith, or, to quote Bishop Mariano Gaviola, then 
secretary-general of the Catholic Bishop's Conference, "a threat to our 
Christian practices and democratic form of government."11 The attitude 
of "friends" and "adversaries" as a fundamental psychological and 
political barrier to the normalization of RP-USSR relations was aptly 
stated by then Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Manuel Collantes when 
he wrote:
Underlying this notion was the assumption that diplomatic 
recognition and diplomatic relations were to be bestowed on a 
country as a sign of approval for that country's internal 
regime and foreign policy and that they were to be witheld from 
another as a mark of disapproval of that country's domestic and 
international policies and actions. Thus, because our people 
reject Communism as unsuitable to our society, we eschewed all 
contact with those states that considered themselves 
Communists, denying visas to basketball players from Yugoslavia 
(of all countries) and suspending relations with Cuba when 
Havana openly espoused Communism.12
It was against this background that the Philippines took a very
conservative view about hastening the establishment of relationship
with the USSR when this was openly discussed in the Philippine Congress
and in the press in 1964 and thereafter. This hesitation was criticized
by the media and other well-meaning citizens, particularly, the
businessmen, as unfounded. So was the fear that such relationship
13would affect "our hitherto close and cordial ties with the US. A
leading national magazine, Graphic in an editorial in 1967, argued
1;1Quoted in an editorial comment of Republic Weekly, (1 July 1971),
p. 1.
12Collantes, op.clt., p.34.
13Javier, op.cit., p.50; Macatuno, op cit., p.10.
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It is hardly necessary at this point to reiterate what is 
now commonly known, that our traditional dependence on the 
United States as a trading partner has been more onerous to us 
than otherwise. The prospects of continued trade with the 
United States on the same scale as before and on the same old 
basis of American dominance and Philippine subservience have 
been growing less and less palatable to right-thinking leaders 
and citizens in this country. Trade relations with the
communist countries, not least of them with Russia, have 
consequently become, first, plausible, and finally in recent 
years, indispensable to a realistic development of the
economy.14
It is not clear even today which country initiated or made the
first move toward establishing normal diplomatic ties. There were
suggestions in Philippine newspapers that the Soviets had "made
1 6overtures to recognize the Philippines as of 1955." This was not
confirmed. It was also said that the Philippines was the one which
initiated the move in anticipation of the termination of the
Laurel-Langley Agreement. Officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1 fiwere not able to verify this newspaper account. But what is certain,
however, was that beginning in 1964, the Soviet Union had sent its
foreign trade experts to attend the ECAFE seminar in Manila. After
this initial contact, the Soviet delegates attended religiously most,
if not all, international conferences in Manila and "Filipinos began to
take part in international seminars and training programs held in the 
17USSR." Soon there was talk about the Soviet Union's willingness to 
recognize the Philippines "as soon as the Philippines says she is ready 
to establish relations."18
14Graphic (22 February 1967), no page.
1 5Macatuno, op.cit., p.ll
16Amelito Mutuc, "The Issue of RP-USSR Relations" in his weekly 
column, My Neighbor and I, in Republic Weekly (4 January 1971), p.4.
1 7Collantes, op.cit., p.36.
18Cf. Emil Jurado, "Red Pattern in Newspapers" Philippines Herald (9 
November 1966), and Nestor Mata, "Nothing Wrong with Red Trade" 
Philippines Herald (9 November 1967). Both are well-known newspaper 
columnists.
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The Philippine Economy and Industrial Journal, among others, wrote 
an editorial endorsing the idea that
Trade and other economic relationship with the Soviet Union 
can balance our deteriorating economic situation by way of 
increased Philippine exports, competitive prices on imports and 
growth on Philippine credit facilities abroad not to mention 
the employment opportunities generated with the opening of new 
factories and industries."19
This view was endorsed by the Philippine Chamber of Commerce. In 
a statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 16 March 
1967, economist Augusto Ceasar Espiritu, president of the Philippine 
Chamber of Industries, stressed the need for negotiating trade 
agreements with other countries like Russia in order to expand the 
market for Philippine products. He said
Trade with Russia and the East European bloc will obviously 
open up new markets for our traditional as well as new exports.
If, according to UN figures, clothing, raw sugar, leather shoes 
and raw tobacco constitute 4 of the 7 major imports of Russia, 
while equipment for industrial plants, crude petroleum, raw 
cotton, wheat, tractors and parts, and agricultural machinery 
are five of her ten principal exports, then there are indeed 
possibilities for expanding trade with Russia.
We should certainly desire to push back the frontiers that 
limit our actions and alternatives. The creation of new outlets 
for our exports, whether traditional or new, and the 
establisment of new suppliers for imports will certainly expand 
foreign trade and widen our range of alternatives.20
This and other endorsements from the business sector appear to 
have been born out of local business and government concern over the 
impending termination of the preferential trade with the traditional 
market —  the United States of America, as provided for by the 1954 
Laurel-Langley Agreement. Under this agreement, the United States 
would absorb Philippine products at a rate higher than the open world 
market. But this agreement was to terminate on 4 July 1974. After this
^ Philippine Economy and Industrial Journal (September-October 1966), 
p.3.
20Industrial Philippines (March 1967), p.34.
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date, the Philippines would have to look for markets abroad for its 
survival. Opening trade relations with the socialist countries was 
seen as one of the options and a way of expanding Philippine markets.
This concern was brought to the attention of Congressman Carmelo 
Barbero who sponsored a resolution, during the Second Session of the 
Sixth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines on January 1967, 
expressing the sentiment in favor of trade with communist countries. 
The full text of the resolution reads:
Sixth Congress of the Republic
of the Philippines 
Second Session
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
H.R. No.35
Introduced by Congressman
Barbero
RESOLUTION
EXPRESSING THE SENTIMENT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN FAVOR OF 
TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND COMMUNIST 
COUNTRIES.
WHEREAS, the Laurel-Langley Agreement will expire in 1974 and 
there is no good prospect of renewing the said treaty;
WHEREAS, it is necessary and expedient for the Philippines 
to look for markets in other countries particularly those of the 
communist countries for trade of their major exports;
WHEREAS, most if not majority of the countries of the world 
including the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, and 
Australia have trade relations with the communist countries including 
Red China;
WHEREAS, it is for the economic development, growth and 
progress of the Philippines to have more trade relations with other 
countries of the world; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, to express as it 
hereby expresses, its section and/or sentiment in favor of 
having trade relations with the Communist countries under terms and 
conditions which the President of the Republic of the Philippines 
may deem expedient and proper.
Adopted.
This resolution was referred to the private sector for comments. 
As this was being done, Congressman Barbero and his colleagues 
introduced House Bill No. 11611, also proposing opening trade relations
24
with the USSR and other communist countries as an alternative to the 
impending termination of the Laurel-Langley Agreement. During the 
discussion on the House Bill No. 11611 and Resolution No. 35, the 
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines and the Chamber of Agriculture 
and Natural Resources of the Philippines were requested to present 
position papers. Private individuals were requested to testify.
The Board of Directors and of the Committee on Commerce of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, in a meeting on 14 March 1967, 
while favoring the trade, recommended deferring of Resolution No. 35 on 
the grounds that
. . . The government of China and Russia are not recognized by 
the Philippine Government and conversely those governments do 
not recognize ours...21
Furthermore the Chamber of Commerce feels that
We shall become communists and trading with communist 
countries will help make us Communists if we do not really 
believe in freedom, if we do not value our civil rights and 
liberties, if we are unprincipled and are voluble and are 
willing to believe every enticing promise made to our ears no 
matter how false.22
For its part, the Chamber of Agriculture and Natural Resources of
the Philippines advocated "full relations with the communist countries,
23culturally and commercially." However, the Chamber argued,
"commercial relations should be subject to the supervision of the 
National Economic Council or any other agency which may be designated 
for the purpose by the government."24 The only fear the Chamber had 
was
Our economic set-up is free enterprise whereby individuals
21Ibid. p .7. 
22Ibid. p .35.
23Ibid. p .7. 
24 loc.cit.
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or companies undertake their respective activities. Communist 
countries on the otherhand, are monolithic and their business 
activities are under the complete control of their respective 
national governments as to easily place Filipino businessmen 
dealing individually at a great disadvantage. Only when the 
time comes that communist countries shall allow their 
individual companies or businessmen to deal separately should 
Filipino businessmen or companies be allowed to undertake 
business or commercial activities with them also separately or 
individually.25
As already stated, the Philippine Chamber of Industries, through 
its president, Augusto Ceasar Espiritu, also endorsed the idea of 
trading with the USSR and other communist countries. But it went 
beyond rhetoric by sponsoring the First Philippine Trade mission to 
Russia and other Eastern European countries on 15 April 1967. This 
mission was composed of Augusto Ceasar Espiritu, chairman; Manuel 
J. Marquez, vice-chairman; Victor A. Lim, secretary-treasurer; Jesus 
T. Bustamante, Edgardo T. Kalaw, Cipriano Lu, George T. Marcelo,
P fiPrimitivo Mijares, and Benjamin Salvosa, members.
The mission was given the tasks of (1) finding out what products
the Philippines could possibly sell and what she could possibly buy
from these countries to the mutual benefit of both countries; (2)
determining the modes and mechanics of setting international accounts;
and (3) opening up new horizons through great knowledge of Filipinos of
27the people of Eastern Europe. The last non-commercial part of the 
mission's goal was addressed to the fact that
Inspite of the advent of mass communication in our modern 
age, the people of the Philippines and those of the countries 
mentioned above continue to have no significant contact with 
each other. For too long, artificial barriers, including those 
erected by ignorance, have divided people from people and
25Ibid. pp.7-8.
26Industrial Philippines (April 1967). See also Treaty Series, 
Vol.6, No.l. Manila: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1967, p.185.
27Treaty Series, ibid. p.182.
26
28nation from nation.
The other reason why the business groups endorsed the idea of 
trading with the USSR was the realization that while the US and other 
countries were doing profitable business with the communist bloc, the 
Philippines had taken no advantage of these opportunities and had 
remained at a distance for fear of communism. House Bill No. 11611, 
however, was shelved because the members of the House of 
Representatives felt there was no adequate study on how to go about the 
establishment of trade with the Soviet Union and other communist 
countries.
On 3 June 1967, the Chamber of Industries' mission returned from 
their trip to USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary with a favorable 
report. All these countries that they visited were eager to trade with 
the Philippines. In the case of the Soviet Union
... it was verified that she is ready to grant the 
Philippines preferential treatment in the entry of Philippine 
products to the USSR and to establish a balanced trade with the 
Philippines, with the entire proceeds of her exports being 
committed for the purchase of Philippine products upon the 
signing of a trade agreement.29
The Philippine trade mission of the Chamber of Industries, on the 
basis of its findings, recommended to President Ferdinand Marcos the 
following measures:
1. Lift immediately the travel ban on Filipinos to the 
Communist countries of Europe. There is much to be gained 
by our citizens in seeing actual conditions behind the Iron 
Curtain.
2. Lift the trade restrictions between the Philippines and 
Communist countries of Europe and allow trading with them 
initially through trade organizations or through an 
inter-chamber board established for this purpose.
O Q Augusto Ceasar Espiritu, "Mission to Russia” Industrial Philippines 
(April 1967), p.4.
29Treaty Series, op.clt., p.182.
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3. The signing of trade agreements with the communist countries 
of Europe should be given careful consideration only after 
some experience in trading with them.30
Apparently the positive endorsements by the private sectors of
trading with the communist countries and the favorable findings of the
Philippine Trade Mission to USSR and Eastern Europe had influenced the
thinking of President Marcos because, in his address before the Manila
Overseas Club, on 24 February 1968, he outlined drastic changes in
foreign policy, including the possible normalization of trade relations
31with the USSR and other communist/socialist states:
There is vehement clamor from some quarters in our midst 
that we should relax and even repudiate our anti-communist 
stance. This is understandable in the light of relaxed tensions 
in Europe, and the policies of co-existence and accomodation 
which the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe socialist states have 
lately espoused.
Many now advocate the establishment of trade relations 
between the Philippines and communist countries, particularly 
the USSR and the Eastern European countries. This matter has 
merited the most serious consideration and study.
The are many also who advocate the unrestricted enjoyment of 
the right to travel to communist countries. This 
Administration, as may be recalled, has liberalized the 
conditions for the travel of Filipinos to communist countries. 
There has been a constant effort on our part to strike a 
balance between the enjoyment of the right to travel and the 
more vital consideration of national security.32
The consideration of the trade option with the USSR and other 
communist countries was in line with the official decision of the 
government to develope an "independent foreign policy." Philippine 
foreign policy has been too American-centric and even one-sided in 
favor of the Americans as evidenced by such major agreements as the 
Laurel-Langley Agreement, the Military Bases Agreement, and the Mutual 
Defense Treaty. Many Filipino leaders suggested moving gradually away
30Ibid. p.184.
31Ferdinand Marcos, "We must survive in Asia" Address at the 
President's Night, Manila Overseas Press Club, February 24, 1968.
Reprinted in Presidential Speeches, Vol.II, Manila, 1978, pp.49-57.
32Ibid. p.51.
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from too much dependence on the United States and expanding the horizon 
of Philippine foreign relations to include establishing diplomatic ties 
with all countries, regardless of ideological differences. This 
included the possible normalization of the Philippine-Soviet relations.
The presidential endorsement of Philippine-Soviet trade relations 
caught public interest. The merits and demerits of the suggestion were 
given wide publicity. But other than saying that the idea was "being 
studied", the government did not make any official announcement 
although the media made "educated guesses" in broadcasts and in print 
about the "Philippines is entering into diplomatic relations with
ooRussia or "is easing its hardline policy against Red China."
For its part, the Soviet Union also welcomed the idea of 
establishing trade relations and ultimately diplomatic ties with the 
Philippines. While it had subdued its eagerness, the Soviet Union 
telegraphed its favorable reaction through sustained goodwill missions 
to the Philippines. These missions were headed by officials of the USSR 
Union of Friendship with Foreign Countries and scholars from the USSR 
Institute of Oriental Studies. Newspapermen from Soviet government
O Knewspapers, like Izvestiya, were frequent Manila visitors. All these 
visitors had expressed "hope that the Philippines and the Soviet Union
o pwill soon establish trade and cultural relations."
The subtle ways by which the Soviets encouraged trade relations 
fitted the pattern of the general USSR strategy of initiating 
diplomatic ties. In the 1950s, the USSR initiated relations with China
qqHeadlines of all newspapers and aired in all radio stations in 
Manila on 25 February 1968.
34Philippines Herald (26 June 1969); Manila Bulletin (27 June 1969).
35Philippines Herald (9 November 1966); Manila Bulletin (19 January 
1971).
36Phillpplnes Herald (26 June 1969).
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onthrough technical assistance, trade, and friendship agreements. When 
the relations between the two countries soured in the 1960s, the 
Soviets shifted their onslaught to Vietnam, at the same time 
strengthening their influence in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the
O OMiddle East through economic, technical, and military assistance. It 
also attempted to gain a foothold in Indonesia in the 1950s and had
Q Qfailed by 1965. The approach to all these linkages had always been 
low-key. Thus, when talks about developing an independent foreign 
policy for the Philippines came out in the open, the Soviets gradually 
and consistently endorsed trade relations with the Philippines.
In any case, as the prospect of trading with communist countries 
and the Soviet Union became public knowledge, the Philippine government 
authorized three trade missions to visit these countries by the middle 
of 1968. The first one was from the legislative branch of the 
government composed of congressmen; the second was from the private 
sector, sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines; and 
the third was from the Department of Commerce, headed by Commerce 
Undersecretary Fernando Campos, sponsored by the executive branch of 
the government, under the Office of the President.4®
These different missions were required to make detailed studies of 
the possibility of hastening the expansion and promotion of Philippine 
exports among Eastern European countries, particularly those which were
0 7 R.G. Boyd, Communist China1s Foreign Policy. New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1962; O.B. Borisov and B.T. Koloskov, Sino-Soviet
Relations, 1945-1973: A Brief History. Moscow: Progress
Publications, 1975.
O O This sentiment was expressed by a number of concerned journalists. 
See "Eloisa Enriquez Khan, "Prospects and Pitfalls of Trading with the 
Communists" Philippines Free Press (16 January 1971), p.34.
ogSee Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism. New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1963.
- 40Manila Times (28 November 1968).
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members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, 
Rumania and the Soviet Union. As Commerce Undersecretary Fernando
Campos reported to President Marcos, "the observations of these
missions do not vary markedly, as they are likely to confirm each
other, that advantages could be derived from trading with some selected 
socialist countries like the Soviet Union and Rumania."41
The report of the eighteen-man mission sponsored by the Chamber of 
Commerce of the Philippines and headed by its president, Teofisto 
Guingoan Jr., strongly endorsed the opening of trade relations during 
the Senate hearing on 4 January 1969. The Chamber of Commerce' 
observations reinforced that of Undersecretary Campos. It observed 
that
1. The potential of trade with socialist countries is big. The 
market is vast in terms of per capita income, population and 
extent of possible demand. It may not supplant our 
traditional markets, but it could provide the much-needed 
market for the expansion of our export trade.
2. All factors vital to trade considered, such as prices, 
customs duties, taxes, shipping facilities and freight, 
banking and handling charges and competinnve sources, many 
Philippine exports can find ready markets in these 
countries. For the present, copra, coconut oil, abaca, rice 
and leather footwear may be immediately exported to these 
countries . . .
3. In return, we may buy from these markets tool-making 
machines for our industrialization programs; machines for 
the manufacture of farm tractors and other agricultural 
machinery and ships to strengthen our interisland and 
overseas commerce. Because of their willingness to be paid 
in our currency at low interest rates on extended deferred 
payment plans, these countries could provide the impetus to 
our industrialization efforts without putting additional 
pressure on our scarce foreign exchange.
4. There is not only an apparent willingness to engage in open 
trade with us but also a willingness to enter into economic
41Report of Three-Man-Fact-Finding Mission to the Soviet Union to the 
President by Fernando Campos, et.al. Quoted by Gaudencio Manalac, "Four 
RP Missions from the East" Manila Times (28 December 1968) p.l.
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Cooperation by way of collaboration in furthering our 
industrialization efforts such as the construction and 
supply of machinery and complete plants, oil exploration and
the development of our infra-structure --  roads,
irrigation, telecommunications, etc.
5. On their part, there are no restrictions in trade with us.
The obstacles are on our side. They are ready to grant visas 
to our businessmen and clear our ships to their ports. They 
deal with all banks of the world regardless of political 
persuasion. They profess a policy of non-interference with 
the internal affairs of other countries.
6. They have greatly improved their industrial and agricultural
productivity through cooperative effort and their farms are
adapted to modern methods of agriculture. Their industries4 2are comparable to those of western countries.
On the basis of these reports from the different missions, the
Foreign Policy Council recommended to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations the opening of trade with socialist countries, including
43USSR, but on "experimental, selective, case-to-case basis." It also
submitted a memorandum asking that "Philippine traders adopt a guarded
and cautious attitude in dealing with communist nations, determine the
sincerity of the Red bloc as trading partners and look into the
question of security, particularly with Soviet Russia."44
The problem of security became the major objection by many
Filipino leaders to the proposal to trade with the communist countries.
Some observers said it was "not yet the time because of its ideological 
45implications." The Philippines was faced with increasing challenges 
from communist-inspired dissident movements, led by the Communist Party 
of the Philippines and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA) . 
In an interview with newsmen, former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Felixberto Serrano, expressed the view that it was not yet time to deal 
with the communist countries. He said that for as long as the danger
42Manila Bulletin (7 January 1969). 
43loc. cit.
44loc. cit.
45Manila Bulletin (7 January 1969).
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of communist agression and subversion in the country persisted, "and 
our conditions within have not materially improved to enable us to meet 
with the risks that such danger possesses in a free intercourse with 
communist countries, let no one fool-hardily unlock what we have sealed 
in wisdom and self-protection . . . With all the enticements that they 
could offer, restricted trade would, step by step, grow into general 
trade, then diplomatic relations... And then as surely as the night 
will follow the day, economic and military aids would follow in ever
A  Oincreasing level until we reach a point of no return."
Similarly, former Central Bank governor Miguel Cuaderno Sr.
expressed his opposition to the proposal of limited trade. He said that
the "plan has serious implications which should be thoroughly studied
47by the government." The country, he said, "does not earn enough
foreign exchange to pay for the increasng import of machinery,
4 8equipment and raw materials required by industrial plants." 
Furthermore, it would not look "well at a time when loans are obtained 
in the United States to bolster the country's international 
reserve..." He endorsed, however, the conservation of "traditional 
markets \i.e. United States and Japan/ for the principal exports of the 
country." Cuaderno's line of reasoning found support from the then 
Senate President Gil Puyat who, in a television interview opposed the 
trade proposal on the grounds that "we have not even exploited to the 
full the ever ready and open market of the United States and other 
countries of the free world." . He also pointed out his concern over 
the security implications of the proposal.
46Philippines Herald (21 January 1969).
47Manila Times (14 February 1969).
48loc. cit.
49loc. cit.
50ibid.
54Manila Times (18 January 1969)
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There were many other objections from other sectors of the 
country. The Philippine Herald, a leading national newspaper, in an 
editorial on 21 January 1969 warned that
The Senate Committee on foreign relations, on commerce and 
industry and on national defense, which are conducting a joint 
hearing on a House measure to authorize the opening of trade 
relations with certain socialist countries, would do well to 
consider carefully and dispassionately the views presented 
before these bodies by former Foreign Secretary Felixberto 
Serrano... There is patent wisdom in this pointed warning that 
the advocates of outright trade with the Reds should pause to 
ponder. The danger... may not be apparent now, for it is not 
for those of us who live today, but for those who shall come 
after us —  our children and our children's children... There 
is a need for careful, conscientious and painstaking study of 
all the aspects and implications of Red trade before any 
definite move is taken, for a wrong or ill-timed decision, 
could be cause for much grief and misgivings."52
On the otherhand, the advocates for opening trade with the Eastern
European bloc were equally vocal about advantages to be derived from
such relations. As then Ambassador to New Delhi, Leon Ma. Guerrero
pointed out: "the Philippines would never know the advantages and
disadvantages of trading with socialist countries unless the country go
53into the venture." This move, he said, "will strengthen our
bargaining position in international affairs and open new markets for 
our products." The Chamber of Agriculture and Natural Resources took 
the stand that "there is nothing wrong in trading with socialist 
countries so long as the relationship is based on and mutually 
exploited within the framework of commercial agreements." It also
allayed the fear of ideological indoctrination of Filipinos by these 
close ties with socialist/communist countries as having "no basis in 
fact, considering that subversive elements have always been active in
52Philippine Herald (21 January 1969). 
53loc. c1t.
54Manlla Chronicle (8 January 1969). 
55loc. cit.
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this country ever since 1946 and yet these groups have not planted so
r
much a firm root to be of any real threat." ° The insurance group also
sent a delegation of Philippine insurance executives to Eastern
European countries on 3 October 1969 and upon their return endorsed the
57trade relations plan.
The Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines which had sent a trade 
mission to USSR and other Eastern European countries in 1969 came out 
with a proposal to change the policy from "case-to-case basis" to 
"chamber-to-chamber basis."88 It pointed out that many businessmen 
were reluctant because of the bureaucratic delays and uncertainties 
involved. It sent a letter to President Marcos recommending direct 
diplomatic relations with communist countries "because of our urgent 
need for diversified export markets to fill our foreign exchange 
requirements for development." It also suggested the following
guidelines:
1. that commodities or products which can be traded with 
communist countries be specified;
2. that the terms or modality under which trading on each 
classification of items exported or sold or any machinery or 
raw materials might be spelled out, such as payment in our 
currency or that of the other countries.80
The Chamber of Commerce recommendation was accepted by the Foreign
Trade Council and the "case-to-case basis" was supplemented with a
"chamber-to-chamber basis." The same endorsement came from the House
of Representatives which also sent its own mission to the socialist
countries, headed by Congressman Nicanor Yniquez who also chaired the
56Manila Chronicle (23 November 1969). 
57loc. cit.
88Manila Chronicle(6 October 1969). 
59Manila Times (30 January 1970).
60loc. cit.
61loc. cit.
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House Committee on Foreign Affairs in mid-1970. Apparently impressed
by the Soviet offer "to develop certain areas of Philippine economy
that they urged the serious consideration either by the government or
by private interests of Soviet aid in the exploration for and
fi Pdevelopment of latent oil resources of this country," the 
Congressional Mission supported the plan to normalize relations with 
the Eastern European countries. It recommended the following steps to 
be taken in order to hasten this relations:
1. Revocation of foreign service regulation preventing 
Philippine diplomats from dealing with counterparts from the 
USSR and East European countries;
2. Deletion of a prohibition printed on the face of all 
Philippine passports against holders travelling to these 
countries;
fi Q3. Encouragement of further cultural and student exchanges.
In spite of opposition, House Bill No. 443, which allowed trading 
with socialist countries, was passed by both Houses in October 1970. 
With the passage of this Bill, a number of Soviet delegations came to 
Manila expressing intent to invest or assist in undertaking projects, 
particularly in steel complex, copper smelting, and shipping. Local 
newspapers came out reporting that "the Philippines had been eyed by 
the Soviets as their No. 1 target for diplomatic relations." That 
this might be true was assessed by the increasing number of Soviet 
tourists and official delegations, as well as by their offers to assist 
in Philippine development programs "with no strings attached, 
particularly with respect to copper smelting, steel industry and 
shipping." In fact, by 1971 the Soviets openly attacked American
62loc. cit.
63loc. cit.
64Manila Bulletin (17 September 1970). 
65Manlla Bulletin (17 December 1970).
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RRpolicies on the Philippines. In strong language, a Soviet
commentator for Izvestiya praised the Philippine move "to increase
trade with the Soviet Union" and to "break the US economic hold of the 
R7economy." He further said that
The American monopolies have seized the Philippine economy 
by the throat. They not only plunder the country's wealth, but 
deny it any chance to resist the onslaught of new imperialist 
predators.88
He noted that the Filipinos "reached this conclusion \to open 
possible diplomatic and trade relations/ under the impact of objective 
factors revealing the true nature of Soviet Union's policy with regard 
to developing countries."89
Those XFilipinos/ who favor the establishment of relations 
between the Philippines and the USSR are ardent patriots of 
their country, anxious to see the independent development of 
the Philippines. They realize that comprehensive political and 
economic relations afford the opportunity to escape the 
clutches of foreign monopolies, whether old or new, who still 
try to penetrate the islands or at least to considerably relax 
their grip.
With the passage of House Bill No. 443, the normalization process 
of the trading relations between the Philippines and Eastern European 
bloc started. The Philippines signed its first trade accord with a 
socialist country, Bulgaria, in July 1970. Other agreements followed. 
In early 1972 diplomatic relations were established with Hungary, the 
German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
66loc. cit.
67PaiIy Mirror (27 May 1971).
68loc. cit.
69loc. cit.
70loc. cit.
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CHAPTER 3
OPENING OF FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The prospects of opening formal diplomatic relations with the USSR 
remained uncertain until 1972, though many observers expected it to 
happen, since the Philippines had by then already established 
diplomatic relations with all the other Soviet-bloc countries of 
Eastern Europe (East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria) and with Yugoslavia, and outer Mongolia. However, the 
Philippines bided its time with respect to signing a formal diplomatic 
accord because of its close relations with the United States, a 
delicate issue, as even Soviet authorities themselves acknowledged.
The question arises why it has taken so long to decide the 
issue of diplomatic ties. Naturally enough, a certain degree of 
prejudice against the leading socialist country cultivated in 
the Philippines by imperialist, chiefly, American propaganda 
did have a part to play here.1 2
Filipino leaders were cautious for fear of losing American support 
of the Philippine economy, though proponents of an early RP-USSR 
accord argued that normalization of relationship would help in 
developing trade relations, and dismissed concern over the US reaction 
as unfounded because "the US, traditionally the protector of the 
Philippines, itself long before the Second World War, has had trade
orelations with Russia."
101enin and Makarenko, op. cit. , p. 39.
2Ben Javier, op. cit. , p. 50.
^loc. cit.
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The debate on the merit and demerit of Philippine-USSR relations 
continued until 1971. One congressional delegation after another went 
to Moscow on a "fact-finding mission."4 *67 There was no indication of 
immediate establishment of diplomatic relations, although "bilateral 
ties in various fields were quite extensive." The Soviets for their 
part continued to stretch their proverbial patience while at the same 
time encouraging visits by Filipino officials, businessmen, labor 
leaders, dance troupes and individual tourists to Moscow. In turn, 
they sent their own government officials, scientists, scholars, labor 
leaders and journalists. When direct action on the political front was 
stalemated, the Soviets telegraphed their anxiety through cultural 
exchanges and official visits. Observed one Filipino journalist: 
"These Soviets do not come here to admire Philippine landscape or taste 
Philippine hospitality. Rather it is the observation that these 
Russians are paving the way for the establishment of diplomatic ties 
with the Philippines."8 9
In March 1972, President Marcos sent Mrs. Imelda Marcos on a 
special mission to the Soviet Union to "discuss the establishment of
Qdiplomatic, trade and cultural relations," at the invitation of the 
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The trip was attacked by local 
political opponents of the President as improper. "The whole thing 
smacked of impropriety" stated Raul Manglapus and Amelito Mutuc, two 
former Philippine envoys and delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention.10 The President defended the trip, saying that it "is well
4See Manalac, op. cit. , p.l.
Olenin and Makarenko, op. cit. , p.35.
6ibid., p .35ff.
7loc. cit.
O Macatuno, op. cit■, p.ll.
9Manila Times, (14 March 1972).
10Manila Bulletin (18 March 1972).
39
worth the expenses even if we were to spend government funds."11
In the same month, "Philippine representatives attended the 15th
1 2Congress of Soviet Trade Unions held in Moscow." This was followed by
the visit of a delegation led by the Minister of Tourism, Jose Aspiras,
in April and May of 1972. While the delegation was in Moscow,
official talks on bilateral trade between the Philippines and the
Soviet Union were also taking place in Tokyo,14 between a Philippines
panel headed by Ambassador Roberto Benedicto and a Soviet group headed
by Ambassador Oleg Troyanovsky. The purpose of the meeting was to
"draw up guidelines for a trade agreement to be submitted to both
countries." In the following year, the Philippine government
approved the export of over $1.5 million worth of copra to the USSR.
This was followed by another shipment of 7,700 long tons of copra,
valued at US$4,566,100 on 4 January 1974. In December 1975, another
shipment, of 20,000 metric tons of copper concentrates valued at
1 RUS$4,751,640 was authorized by the Philippine government.
This increasing trade was paralleled by increasing cultural and 
diplomatic visits by officials and private organizations. The 
atmosphere had been cleared by glowing reports on developments behind 
the Iron Curtain. But the Soviets considered the visit of Mrs. Marcos 
in March 1972 as "a landmark in Philippine-Soviet relations."
... Mrs. Imelda Marcos met in Moscow with the then Chairman 
of the USSR Council of Ministers Alexei N. Kosygin; Foreign 
Minister Andrei A. Gromyko; Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai 
S. Patolichev; Chairmen of the two Houses of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of
11
12
13
14
15
16
Manila Times (18 March 1972). 
Olenin and Makarenko, op. clt., 
loc. cit.
Philippine Diplomacy, op. cit., 
loc. cit. 
loc. cit.
p.35.
p.251.
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Nationalities, and other statesmen and public figures. Those 
meetings and discussions played a major role in expanding the 
basis of cooperation in various fields on the principles of 
equality and mutual benefit ...
In July 1972, shortly after Mrs. Marcos' return to the
Philippines, a Philippine-USSR Friendship Society was officially
18launched, with Minister of Labor Bias Ople as the chairman. The 
members of this Society included almost all well-known writers, 
scholars, and academicians of the Philippines. It was through this 
Friendship Society that extensive contacts between the two countries 
were carried out before there were formal diplomatic relations. Two 
years later, the Society's counterpart was organized in Moscow, under 
the aegis of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural 
Relations with Foreign Countries.
These two Societies were highly responsible for paving the way to 
establishing diplomatic ties through reciprocal exchanges of 
socio-cultural programs that helped much in easing local prejudices, 
fears, and suspicions. "The strongest impact of the new contact between 
the Philippines and the USSR", wrote then Undersecretary Manuel 
Collantes, "was made in the arts."20 The Philippine-USSR Friendship 
Society, for example, invited the Russian poet, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, to 
meet Filipino poets and writers. He was followed by other performing 
artists. To facilitate further exchange programs, the two societies 
signed a cultural cooperation agreement on 30 December 1973. The 
signing of this agreement was followed by a series of visits by Soviet 
artists and cultural troupes.
17loc^ cit.
1 8 Collantes, op. cit. , p.36. 
1 . cit.
20loc. cit.
21Philippine Diplomacy, op. cit. , p.252.
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The first Soviet envoys in arts to come to the Philippines "were
members of the world famous Bolshoi Theatre Company, the Beryozka Dance
Company and such performing groups as the Yunost and Kabardinka 
22ensembles." From the Philippine end, the Bayanihan Dance Company,
the Filipinescas Dance Company, and the Madrigal Chamber Choir went to
Moscow, and the playwright Rolando Tinio went there to work on an
anthology of Soviet poetry. Conductor Redentor Romero of the
Philippine Philharmonic Orchestra also undertook a series of
23performances in Moscow and other Soviet cities.
Beneath these visible cultural contacts, the "material foundation
for Philippine-Soviet ties were quietly being worked out. A delegation
from the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine came in March 1974 to
discuss possibilities of Soviet merchant vessels operating in the 
24Philippines." This visit was followed by the trade mission which came
on 10-14 September 1973 to "discuss with the Philippine government
officials the possibility of a trade agreement between the two 
25countries." The visit was reciprocated by a twelve-man mission in 
1974 headed by Filemon Rodriguez, president of the Philippine Chamber 
of Industries, to explore trade possibilities. Upon its return, the 
delegation reported favorably on the prospects for trade.
In March 1975, a delegation of Philippine economic officials led 
by NEDA (National Economic and Development Authority) deputy 
governor-general Nicanor Fuentes, went to the Soviet Union "to find out 
possibilities of expanding and diversifying trade relations with them
22Olenin and Makarenko, op. cit. , p.64.
23loc. cit. , pp.40-41.
24Philippine Diplomacy, op. cit. , p.251.
25loc. cit.
26Cf. Collantes, op. cit., p.36; Philippine Diplomacy, op. cit. ,
pp.251-52.
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27and to other Eastern European countries." In August of the same
year, another trade mission, led by Assistant Executive Secretary Ramon
Cardenas, went to Moscow to arrange ways to facilitate the
establishment of official relations between the two countries. Shortly
thereafter, "all negotiations were conducted at vice-ministerial level
of the trade agreement that was to be signed during the visit of
28President Marcos in Moscow."
With the groundwork now laid, it was only a matter of time before 
diplomatic relations between the Philippines and the Soviet Union would 
be formally established. A favorable climate of trade had been created 
and although trading was minimal, it showed a promise of future 
substance. Until 1974, "copra constituted practically the Philippines'
2Qonly export to the USSR," but abaca fiber (hemp) and crude coconut 
oil were also introduced to the Soviet market. The most important 
event during 1974-75 was the purchase of 400,000 metric tons of sugar 
by the USSR.30
In the private sector, a joint RP-USSR shipping venture undertaken 
by the Soviet government and Filipino businessmen who organized the 
FilSov (Filipino-Soviet) Shipping Company, incorporated on 26 July 
1974. The company acted as general agents and exclusive brokers for 
all Soviet vessels calling at Philippine ports. The organizing group 
was composed of five Filipinos and four Russians: Eduardo Cojuangco,
chairman; Narciso Pineda, vice-chairman; Prudencio Teodoro, Agustin 
Tanco, and Sixto Brillantes, directors; Valerie V. Makarov, president ; 
Vitaliy G. Dudarev, Marat S. Tchestneichi and Pavel A. Vasilchenko,
27Collantes, op. cit., p.36.
28loc. cit.paPhilippine Diplomacy, op. cit.
30Ibld.; See also Manila Times (12 April 1972) and Manila Bulletin 
(13 April 1972); Collantes, op. cit., p.36.
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31managing directors.
During the discussions on the formalization of trade, the Soviets 
reminded the Filipinos of "the huge size of the Soviet market, that the 
USSR is an important buyer of consumer goods, including shoes, 
garments, knit-wear and tobacco, which are of export interests to the 
Philippines, and that the rapidly expanding Far East is quite close to 
the Philippines."32
With all preparations made, President and Mrs. Marcos visited
33Moscow from 30 May to 8 June 1976. In a dinner given for the
Philippine delegation, N.V. Podgorny, president of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet Presidium, acknowledged the significance of the official visit
04as a "new page in Soviet-Philippine relationship." Marcos said that
it is the perception of the Philippines that peaceful co-existence
could guarantee the use of the world's vast resources and energy of
35mankind for general development instead of universal destruction.
On 2 June 1976 the RP-USSR diplomatic relations were initiated by 
the signing of three documents in the Vladimirsky Hall of the Kremlin,
o Ra Joint Communique, a Joint statement and a Trade Agrement. The
Communique signed by Podgorny and Marcos spelled out the official
31"FilSov's Second Year" Philippine Trade and Development Vol. VI, 
No. 2 (1976), p.36.
32Collantes, op. cit.
33 Part of the statement which Marcos read is the following: "It has
taken many years to prepare the way for this meeting between the Soviet 
Union and the Philippines, and we are pleased to be able to make the 
visit ... We expect this visit to signal a new period of cooperation, 
friendship and trade between our two countries ... Reprinted in 
"Manila-Moscow Ties" New Phi 1ippines (June 1976), p.2.
0 4 Ibid. , p.3. Podgorny also said that ... that the speedy
establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the 
Philippine Republic would raise these relations to a qualitatively new 
level and would assist their stable advances on the basis of peaceful 
co-existence."
35Ibid.
°°Basic document published in Pamana (February 1977), pp. 35-36. See 
also New Philippines, op. cit. , p. 8.
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establishment of diplomatic relations.37 The Joint statement embodied 
their decisions for establishing diplomatic relations, and also served 
as a guideline for cooperation in various fields.38 The first area of 
concern was trade . . . the expansion of trade on an equitable and 
mutually beneficial basis. The second area of concern was scientific 
and technical cooperation ... to promote the exchange of scientists and 
postgraduate students and to widen contacts between research 
institutions and organizations. The third area of concern was the 
importance of cultural exchanges ... the further development of 
contacts in the field of culture, education, and sports. The Trade 
Pact was signed by Finance Secretary Cesar Virata for the Philippines 
and Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev for the Soviet Union on 2 
June 1976.
With formal relations established, the Philippines established 
their embassy in Moscow on 2 August 1977, headed by Minister-Counsellor 
Juan Ona as Charge d'affaires. A month later, The Soviet Union 
established their embassy in Manila on 5 September 1977, headed by 
Second Secretary Valery Butrin as Charge d'affaires. Both charge's 
were later replaced by ambassadors —  Valerian Mikhailov for the Soviet 
Union and Luis Moreno for the Philippines.38
Two other Agreements were signed after the establishment of formal 
relations. One was the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation signed by Mrs. 
Marcos and Gromyko on 7 July 1978. The other was the Agreement for 
Scientific and Technical Cooperation signed by Mrs. Marcos and Council 
of Ministers vice-president Marchuk on 8 July 1982.
37See Appendix A. Source: Philippine Diplomacy, op. cit. pp.337-339. 
38loc. cit.
39loc. cit.
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3.1 Later Developments
The period from 1980 to 1985 was the highpoint in Philippine-USSR 
relations, characterized by increasingly closer ties. While this state 
of affairs irritated Washington, it pleased Moscow which placed the 
Philippines in a rather special status among ASEAN nations, due 
according "red carpet" reception to visiting Filipino officials, 
particularly Mrs. Marcos who was always received "by the Soviets with 
all the pomp and ceremony usually reserved for full-fledged heads of 
state."40 In turn, Soviet visitors were given a "five-star" reception 
in the Philippines, and Soviet artists, scientists, writers, and 
officials were frequent visitors.
These apparent social and cultural, as well as technical exchanges 
were used by both countries to achieve their respective economic and 
political ends. For the Philippines, the USSR was seen as possible 
leverage for the re-negotiation with the Americans over the "terms of 
reference" of the military bases and as an alternative source of 
economic assistance, should other sources become less accessible. In 
fact, President Marcos was quoted time and again, to have said that
"should the US withold aid sought by the Philippines, the Soviet Union 
stood ready to help."41 This "new faith" in the "new ally" was to be 
repeated even on the eve of the collapse of the Marcos regime in 1986.
Within ASEAN "the Philippines \was/ arguably the country with the 
fewest publicly expressed suspicions about the Soviet Union."42 In
fact, as early as 1978, constructive relations were expressed in a
joint statement issued by both countries in Manila during the visit of
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Fiyubin. The joint statement 
read in part:
40Asiaweek, (23 July 1982), p.14.
Sheila Ocampo, A Quiet Soviet Quest" Far Eastern Economic Review 
(1979), p.49.
42Asiaweek, op. cit., p.14.
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On the developments affecting the region, the Philippines 
and Soviet officials agreed that peaceful and constructive 
relations among the Asian states can best be achieved through 
non-resort to the use of force in the settlement of disputes 
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
In this regard, Philippine officials expressed to the Soviet 
side the desire of the Philippines to contribute, together with 
its ASEAN partners, to the creation of a climate conducive to 
peace and stability in the region.
The Soviet officials in turn, evinced the desire, on the 
part of the Soviet Union, to develop relations with ASEAN 
member states and expressed support for the peaceful character 
of ASEAN.
Both sides voiced the hope that current tensions in the43Asian region should be settled through peaceful means.
While both sides "affirmed that their relations should be 
developed under the principles of peaceful co-existence, respect for 
each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference, 
equality and mutual benefit," there was no mention of the ASEAN stand 
on the region as a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality."44 It 
appeared then that the Philippines was acting on its own even if it 
were hinting at sentiments supportive of ASEAN position on unity of the 
region as a whole.
Although favorable relations between the Philippines and the
Soviet Union existed, there were also points of mild strains.
4 6Unconfirmed sources, for example, state that the Soviets while openly 
saying that they respect Philippine sovereignty and territorial
A ^
integrity had "violated Philippine airspace and territorial waters."
In January and again in July 1980, the Soviets asked permission from
47the Philippine government to "fly relief goods to Vietnam." Earlier 
in 1979, the Soviets sought to send "two naval ships to Manila on a
43Straits Times (Singapore), 29 October 1978. 
44loc. cit.
43Straits Times (Singapore).
46Straits Times (Singapore), 7 July 1980.
47 loc. cit.
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48good will visit." Manila turned it down, arguing that it would
violate the ASEAN policy on neutrality. In July 1982, the Soviets
again requested "for ship repair facilities," through the joint venture
49FilSov in Zambales, where the major US naval base is located. Again, 
the request was turned down.
In spite of these refusals, the USSR went ahead and flew over
Philippine air space seven times in 1980; in one of their "earlier
violations one plane went as far as 120 km. off Subic Bay, home of the
solarge United States Seventh Fleet." The Philippines protested on the 
grounds that these violations "manifest apparent disregard for basic 
principles that govern relations between states." The Soviet Union 
categorically rejected the protest notes and denied that its planes
k p"had intruded into Philippine airspace."
These "nunor incidents" were reinforced through the unofficial use 
by the Soviets of FilSov Shipping Company \in bringing in/ commercial 
vessels carrying sophisticated electronic equipment to conduct 
soundings of Philippine waters for naval and submarine operations." 
The Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs brought this to light, 
saying that "the data would familiarize the Soviets with the Philippine 
territorial waters, coastal areas and its strategic entry and exit 
points." It pointed out further that
This means possible interference with our communications 
network, monitoring of the movements of US naval vessels in and 
out of the Subic naval base and possible contacts with
48Ibid.
49Straits Times (Singapore), 22 July 1982. 
50loc. cit.
51Ibid.
52Straits Times (Singapore), 7 July 1980.
53Ibid.
54New Straits Times, 16 September 1980.
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subversive groups in sensitive areas of the country. 55
In spite of this revelation, there was no response from the Soviet 
Union, either in the form of clarification or denial. Instead, the 
Soviet government overwhelmed the Marcos regime with invitations to 
come to the USSR and with proposals to expand its ties with the 
Philippines. As the Asiaweek described it:
The Russians were clearly delighted to welcome a friendly 
ASEAN face at a time when other nations in the grouping were 
delivering almost daily condemnation of Vietnam's bankrolled 
occupation of Cambodia. Premier Tikhonov gave the First Lady a 
very important letter addressed to President Marcos, while 
Foreign Minister Gromyko stressed the USSR's commitment to 
regional and world peace. He asked his guest \i.e. the First 
Lady/ to deliver the message of peace to her husband, and "to 
whomever else it will be useful to convey it to." Few doubted 
that Gromyko's "whomever else" meant anyone but other ASEAN 
heads of state.56
The above observation refers to Mrs. Marcos' visit to Moscow in
July 1982 to attend the Tchaikovsky competition in which Filipina
pianist Rowena Arrieta was a finalist. In that visit she was
accompanied by, among others, Trade and Industry Minister Roberto
Ongpin and Natural Resources Minister Roberto Pena who met Soviet
officials for talks on trade and other economic matters.58 This
included the proposal to establish "a cement factory to produce one
million tons annually, participation in geological oil exploration and
59in th? building of prefabricated low-cost housing units." There was 
also a proposal to establish a "fruit canning factory and
pharmaceutical factory, the product of which could be exported to the
55loc. cit.
Asiaweek, op. cit., p.14. 
57loc. cit.
58The Star 6 July 1982. 
59Ibid.
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fif)Soviet Union." The Soviets were represented, in these talks by V.I. 
Litvinenko, deputy chairman of the State Committee on Foreign Economic 
Relations .
The purposes of these meetings were crystallized in the Agreement
between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the Republic of the Philippines for Cooperation in the Field of Science
R 1and Technology. Article II of the Agreement provides for:
1. exchange of scientist, specialists and representatives of 
industrial and trade organizations interested in scientific 
and technological cooperation.
2. exchange of technical documentation and information.
3. arrangement of bilateral conference and symposia on subjects 
of mutual interests.
4. other forms of cooperation in the field of science and 
technology.
The parties also agreed to "encourage the establishment of 
scientific and technological contacts between the appropriate 
organizations, agencies, universities, and firms in both countries and,
R pas mutual needs arise, the conclusion of separate agreements."
This Agreement paved the way for the development of other project 
proposals for which the Soviet Union was willing to provide assistance. 
After the signing of the Science and Technology Agreement, for example, 
Manila gave the Soviets permission to "begin a feasibility study and to 
start negotiating over participation in a joint-venture partnership," 
\the Semirara Cement Plant Project/.63
Filipino businessmen protested that the new proposal might prevent 
other companies from bidding for the cement project. They even feared
60loc. cit.
61loc. cit.
62loc. cit.
R ^ Guy Sacerdoti and Leo Gonzaga, 
Economic Review, (3 September 1982),
"Soviet Cement Imprint" Far Easter 
p. 96.
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that it could supplant "the earlier assignment of the cement project to 
a group which included the US based Philipp Brothers Company."64 
However, officials from the Ministry of Trade and Industry argued that 
Soviet involvement was a "totally new ball game altogether" because it 
called for a "Soviet team of experts" to work with their Filipino 
counterparts in overseeing and managing the cement project. Other 
concerns included issues of national security. Again, the Trade and 
Industry officials gave assurance that "We have a lot of ability and 
experience when it comes to cement." As to the entry of Soviet
technicians who might be involved in intelligence data gathering, the 
Filipino officials further pointed out that "we do not need as big a 
group of Russians ..." Furthermore, the project was planned for a 
small island and this "should make the security problem more manageable 
too."66
If there were local "worries" over the security implications of 
the project, there was even deeper concern in Washington, especially 
when the Soviets asked for a dry-dock facilities to be added to the 
Semirara project. In a US Congressional Hearing on Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, assessment was made on the strategic significance of the 
Semirara cement plant project to US security interests in the
Philippines. A quote from the proceedings of the hearing is 
insightful:67
Mr. Pritchard (member of the committee): The location of
this island is very strategically placed, when you consider 
where Manila is. Would you suppose that in the building of 
that cement plant there would be a certain capacity of
electronic monitoring?
°^loc. cit.
65loc. cit.
66loc. cit.
67US Congressional Hearing on the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific 
Affairs (Washington DC), "Philippines", 1983, p.218.
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Mr. Gordon (testifying): There is no question about that. 
In our Ambassador's office in Manila are photographs of Soviet 
aircraft that have overflown the capital in the last several 
years. I am sure you have seen that. The location at Cam Ranh 
has made that more simple than it ever was before. A location 
in the Philippines electronically is going to facilitate that 
effort.
Obviously, the Philippines are going to say, as they have, 
"we can control this effort; we have enough experience with 
cement operations, we don't really have to worry." Yet one of 
the most experienced countries in the region in special branch 
operations, the Malaysians, has had very difficult experience 
with Soviet espionage. It was only two years ago that the 
principal KGB agents were expelled from the country, and that 
it is in the country, barring Singapore, which has had the most 
sophisticated background in counterintelligence operations. 
Without in any way denigrating the capacity of the Filipinos to 
undertake that activity, I think they are going to have a very 
difficult time in monitoring the effort by the Soviets in the 
Philippines.
Mr. Pritchard: Have they signed a contract in this cement 
plant?
Mr. Gordon: The contract, I believe, has been signed. The 
preliminary contract has been signed. They are dickering now 
as to how many technicians. As I pointed out in my testimony, 
the Malaysians have refused such an operation because it has 
taken 10 years in terms of agreeing as to how many Soviet 
technicians would be involved in a dam project there. The 
Malaysians won't bite it, but the Filipinos have gone ahead. 
It is a very attractive arrangement. It is a no-pay 
arrangement. Because it is on an island, the Filipinos say that 
"it is possible for us to keep them away from sensitive 
places."
Mr. Pritchard: They are thinking as far as the rub-off into 
their other major islands. But from a matter of electronics, 
the island is probably better because it is off by itself.
Mr. Gordon: That would be my view.
What worried the US most in this Semirara venture was its possible 
implications for American security in the archipelago. As the US 
Congressional Committee had pointed out
The notion of Soviet involvement in yet another deep-water 
harbor facility on the South China Sea, so close to important 
US naval installations, is one that warrants attention. Even 
the generally more disciplined and restrained Vietnamese have 
found it less than easy to exercise the control they might like 
to have over Soviet activities within their territory. In the 
Philippines, where favors and friendships go very far, and 
where "considerations" have helped in the awarding of contracts 
and much else, the USSR is liable to find that its cement plant 
investment will have multiple payoffs.68
68 Ibid., pp.184-185.
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A similar view was expressed by the Far Eastern Economic Review in 
September 1982:
. . . the agreement of the project worked out in Moscow calls 
for a Soviet team of experts to arrive in Manila by the end of 
August, but there has been no official word yet from either 
Soviet or local Ministry of Trade officials on the technicians' 
schedule.
If the same scheme takes off —  and that is a very big .if —  
it will be the first Soviet industrial project in the 
Philippines and the first substantial investment by Moscow 
anywhere in the region since the vast and ostentatious projects 
built during the early 1960s in Indonesia during the declining 
years of the late President Sukarno's Left-leaning regime.
In spite of the concern of the United States and the other ASEAN
countries, the Philippine government maintained its good relations with
the USSR. The cement factory project was temporarily held in abeyance
but the coal project under the Semirara development complex, managed by
the Vulcan group of companies, proceeded to explore the Antique
70province hinterland for coal deposits. In the meantime,
Soviet-Philippine trade continued to increase but in an unbalanced 
fashion, with Philippine exports far outstripping imports. As a whole, 
however, trade relations had reached a truly significant level, an 
increase of almost 1,800 per cent. From 1975 to 1980 Philippine exports 
to the USSR grew from $10 million to $190 million, while imports grew 
only from $300,000 to $22 million.
Table 3-1 summarizes the trends of Philippine-USSR trade since 
1975.71
In addition to trade and technical assistance programs, the
ft QSacerdoti and Gonzaga, op. cit. , p.196.
70Personal interview with Dr. Walter Brown, president, Vulcan 
Enterprises. The group later (in 1984) gave up the management of 
Semirara Cement and Coal project. The National and Development 
Company, headed by Trade Minister Roberto Ongpin took over. See also 
US Congressional Hearing, op. cit,
71 Cf. Asiaweek, op. cit. , p. 14; Far Eastern Economic Review, op. 
cit., p. 49.
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Table 3-1: Five-Year Trends of 
(in million
RP-USSR Trade 
$)
Year Exports 
to USSR
Percentage
increase
Import 
from USSR
Percentage
increase
1975 10 _ 0.3 _
1976 87 770.0 2 566.7
1977 130 49.4 5 150.0
1978 40 69.2 6 20.0
1979 83 107.5 8 33.3
1980 190 128.9 22 175.0
Five-year annual Five-year annual
average increase 360% average increase 1446%
Total five-year Total five-year
increase 1800% increase 7233%
Soviets also stepped up their cultural exchange programs, securing in
the process the goodwill and patronage of Mrs. Marcos. In July 1982,
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR invited Mrs. Marcos to
visit Moscow to attend the finals of the 7th International Tchaikovsky
contest. In Moscow, Mrs. Marcos met Soviet officials who continued
to impress on her the need to maintain friendly ties with the
73Philippines "in the present complex international situation." This 
was consistent, they said, with the Soviet Union's policy on peaceful 
cooperation among states regardless of political persuasion. On one 
occasion, Gromyko stressed "the invariability of the Soviet Union's 
course toward developing all-round mutually beneficial relations with
72Soviet News, No.40 (10 July 1982), p.2. 
73loc. cit.
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the Republic of the Philippines on the basis of universally recognized 
principles of peaceful co-existence. He noted that "the continuing
tensions in Southeast Asia could not but cause apprehension . . . the 
solution to the problems facing the region was up to the states of 
Southeast Asia themselves, and no one had the right to interfere in the 
internal affairs of that region . . . the Soviet Union sided with those 
who are striving to turn this region into a zone of peace and 
stability."75
It was apparent that Mrs. Marcos was given a geopolitical 
orientation and a "soft-sell" of Soviet policies in the ASEAN region, 
knowing her connections and capability to influence the direction of 
Philippine foreign policy. In reply to this political salesmanship, 
Mrs. Marcos "reaffirmed the intention of the government of the 
Philippines to make specific steps for the further development of 
bilateral relations between the USSR and the Republic of the
Philippines, ... expressing the readiness to contribute as far as 
possible to the relaxation of tensions, the attainment of real 
disarmament and the improvement of the international climate."
This indirect approach to diplomacy continued to characterize even
the cultural relations between the USSR and the Philippines. Every
occasion or historic date on the Philippines was given good media
exposure. Letters of greeting, personal occasions and national affairs
77like the commemoration of independence day continued well up to 1985. 
The cultural exchange programs were also stepped up. The
Philippine-USSR Friendship Societies were also given all the support
74loc. cit.
75Ibid., p.3
76Ibid.
77Cf. Soviet News, 14 December 1981; Soviet News, 18 January 1982;
Soviet News, 12 June 1984; Soviet News, 4 November 1984; Soviet News, 8 
July 1985.
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they needed to carry out their respective programs in cultural 
exchanges and other cooperative activities. In January 1984, a 
two-year plan for cooperation was signed in Moscow by Deputy chairman 
for the USSR Societies of Friendship G. Yanayev; honorary chairperson 
of the Philippine-USSR Friendship Society, Mrs. Marcos; and president 
of the Philippine-USSR Society, Minister of Labor Bias Ople.78 This 
occasion marked the end of the year-long celebration of the 10th 
anniversary of the USSR-Philippine Friendship Society set up in Moscow 
in 1973.
The celebration included a ceremonial public meeting in Moscow; an 
exhibition of paintings by Filipino artist Edcel Moscoso; an exhibition 
of books about the Philippines published in USSR; and a dance-concert 
by both Filipino and Russian performing artists. Appraising the event, 
USSR Deputy Minister of Culture and president of the USSR-Phi1ippine 
Friendship society, Mamara Globubtsova, said that the two Societies had 
succeeded in bringing the two countries closer than before.
As USSR Deputy Minister of Culture, I am particularly 
pleased that it is in the field of culture that our relations 
\with the Philippines/ develop at the most rapid rate.79
In her message to Moscow, Mrs. Marcos cited both Societies for 
their respective valuable works in promoting friendly relations and 
"for being the foundation of the growth of bilateral ties between our 
two countries."80
In June 1985, six months after the anniversary celebration of the 
Friendship Societies, the Soviets honored Lucrecia Kasilag, a leading 
Filipino composer and head of the Philippine Cultural Center, with the 
AVICENA Prize for her achievements in the field of culture and cultural
78Soviet News, 9 January 1985, p.ll. 
79loc. cit.
80loc. cit.
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understanding. The award, consisting of a diploma and a medal of the 
laureate of the International Prize named after Abu Ali Iban Sina 
(Avicena), was instituted on the initiative of the Novosti Press Agency 
in 1981.81 The prize
is annually awarded to one citizen of an African or Asian 
country for best works in literature, journalism, and social 
sciences, for the activity in propagating the idea of peace and 
friendship among Asians, African, and Soviet peoples.82
The Kasilag award highlighted the efforts of the Soviets, and to a 
large extent also the Philippines, to further cement the RP-USSR 
relations through culture. In politics, the Soviets also used the same 
symbolic approach. In August 1985, for example, the Soviet government 
through its ambassador in Manila, Yuri Sholmov, awarded President
O OMarcos the "distinguished jubilee medal" in recognition of his
84"combat merits and contributions to the victory during World War II."
The jubilee medal award was instituted by the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet in connection with the "40 years of Victory in the Great
Patriotic War 1941-1945", which "is awarded to the veterans in our
country as well as foreign citizens in recognition of their combat
85merits and contribution to the achievement of the Great Victory."
The award was given to President Marcos during (or calculatedly 
made to coincide with) the joint anniversary celebration of the PC/INP 
(Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police) in Camp Crame in 8 
August 1985. During the presentation of the medal, Ambassador Sholmov 
said:
8:tSoviet News, 1 June 1985, p.8.
82loc. cit.
83loc. cit.
84 It needs to be noted that at this time Marcos World War II record 
was not yet suspect.
85loc. cit.
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... I am happy to announce that the Presidium of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet has taken a decision to award His Excellency 
Ferdinand E. Marcos this medal as a sign of recognition of his 
deeds of valour, his heroism against forces of facism and 
militarism.
... We highly appreciate the contribution of the Filipino 
people to the achievement of our common victory and are well 
aware of the immeasurable sufferings of your nation under the 
yoke of foreign invaders which resulted in the loss of one 
million lives, and the ruthless destruction of your beautiful 
capital. We remember the heroic struggle of the Philippine
soldiers and guerillas, the courage and valor of the 
participants in the "Death March," the unbroken spirit of the 
Philippine resistance. It is also well known in the Soviet 
Union that you, Mr. President, actively participated in the 
fight against occupants . . . Your outstanding service in the 
rout of evil forces of fascism and militarism is highly 
appreciated world over and this jubilee medal is a symbol of 
this high appreciation on the part of the Soviet people.86
It is easy to deduce from these statements the expert use of 
symbolic diplomacy to accomplish certain hegemonic ends. The fact that 
the awarding took place during a military ceremony made it the more 
significant. In accepting the award, President Marcos also took the 
occasion to extol the significance of RP-USSR relations in the face of 
mounting economic, geopolitical, and insurgency problems. The fact 
that, as stated above, the awarding and acceptance was contextualized 
in military affairs may be interpreted as an attempt on the part of 
Marcos to signal to the United States which had threatened to scrap its 
military assistance to the Philippines if the reforms recommended by 
Washington were not implemented, that he had other options should the 
US carry out its threat.
It needs to be recalled that even as early as 1976, President 
Marcos, in opening diplomatic ties with the USSR, had already 
appreciated the role of Russia as "a new friend" of the Philippines. He 
said then: "it is our hope that in establishing relations with the 
Soviet Union we have found a new friend, in as much as we cannot afford
86loc. cit.
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enemies." In later years (1983 to 1985), Marcos continued to attempt
to neutralize American pressure by saying that if the US would make it
difficult for him, insofar as the re-negotiation of the bases and
military assistance were concerned, he would enter into some "kind of
87modus vivendi with the Soviet Union."
Seen in this context, the awarding and receiving of the jubilee 
medal might be interpreted as indicators of the direction to which 
Philippine foreign policy was headed. In accepting the award, Marcos 
said:
This award, Mr. Ambassador, generously recognizes my humble 
and modest role in the global war that came to a close of 40 
years ago. And I am profoundly grateful for the honor. For I 
know the historic role played by the Soviet Union which offered 
20 million lives in that great war, 20 million lives as a 
sacrifice for the attainment of freedom against the forces that 
would destroy that freedom. It is indeed an honor to be 
identified with the great heroes of the Soviet Union ...
In accepting this award, therefore, I do so on behalf of our 
people and government, in full awareness of the work that must 
continue, and conscious of the fraternity of ideals that bring 
our peoples together ...
This generous gesture of friendship from the Soviet Union is 
of more than passing meaning to this moment of re-dedication in 
our country to the cause of peace, security and progress.
It encourages us to hope that other nations will truly
respect our national sovereignty and independence and not
aspire to intervene in the mistaken belief that we are88vulnerable and weak, being a relatively small nation.
It is clear that the phrase "not aspire to intervene" refers to
the United States whose two military bases were being re-negotiated.
This posture had serious geopolitical implications for the US military
presence in Subic and Clark, considering the local resentments over
them and the fact that "President Marcos has done nothing, despite some
89protestations to the contrary, to mute those developments."
Encouraged by this increasingly favorable relations with Filipino
87Asiaweek, op. cit. , p.14.
^ Bulletin Today, 9 August 1985.
89Cf. US Congressional Hearings, op, cit.
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leaders, the Soviets sent to the Philippines a number of visitors and 
delegations in "goodwill missions." In October 1985, Mrs. Marcos 
visited Moscow in what had been described as "a religious 
pilgrimage," accompanied by 16 members of Parliament who were to meet 
with their Soviet counterparts to "exchange notes" on parliamentary 
system of government and to negotiate for expanded cultural exchange 
programs.
Mrs. Marcos, presented the image of the Lady of Fatima to the 
Cathedral of St. Louis in Moscow. A Filipino priest, Fr. Josefino 
Ramirez, who accompanied her, joined the Russian priests in celebrating 
the mass. In presenting the image, Mrs. Marcos said: "We come on a 
pilgrimage of peace. The images are symbols of love and peace between 
the Filipinos and the Russians." Responding, Fr. Stanislavas Mozeka, 
the parish priest of the Cathedral, said: "I never imagined that I 
would be able to see the image of the Fatima enshrined in my church 
during my lifetime."91
While the ritual appeared to be religious, its political 
underpinnings were apparent. The affair appeared to be trivial on the 
surface, but its propaganda impact in terms of the geopolitical link of 
the USSR with the Philippines acquired an added dimension. Over 
seventy per cent of Filipinos are Catholics and this gesture on the 
part of the Soviets could soften, if not change, the image of USSR as 
"anti-God" communists. In terms of broader geopolitical linkages, the 
Philippines could serve the purpose for added influence in Southeast 
Asia.
While the RP-USSR relations developed rapidly and smoothly, 
economic and political relations continued to meet with sporadic
90Daily Express, 29 October 1985. 
91loc. cit.
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"strains." The Philippines had exercised continued restraints in 
implementing many of the USSR proposed modes and means of helping the 
economic recovery program of the Philippines, including easy repayment 
plans. The Semirara Cement Plant project, for example, was postponed 
indefinitely and so was the Soviet participation in the Kalinga-Apayao 
dam project. In trade, a decline was registered in 1985. In fact, 
Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Boris Aristov complained that the total 
RP-USSR trade had decreased from a total of $172 million in 1981 to 
$57.8 million in 1985.92
Aristov suggested the following steps to remedy the situation:
1. Barter trade or counter trade. In exchange for Philippine 
agricultural products, the USSR could provide machinery.
2. Market Philippine products through a compensation freight 
deal. The Soviets would ship Philippine products to the 
world market and freight payment will come from the profits 
of sale.
3. Construction of industrial plants. Through different forms
of easy repayment plans, the USSR would help finance the 
construction of plants such as for processing agricultural 
products. At the same time, they would help export the
products of this plant.
4. Expansion of the Philippines' ship repair program. The 
facilities in the Philippines were not adequate. Again, 
through commodity repayment, the USSR would expand the ship 
repair program by financing additional facilities.
5. A joint corporation in fishing and processing of marine 
products.92
Many of these points were discussed by the Soviets with the 
Philippine officials, including "interested parties" in the private 
sectors, but no action resulted. The Soviets cited other ASEAN 
countries which traded with the USSR on the basis of the five-point 
proposals suggested by Aristov. Thailand "is already doing this with
92Paily Express, 1 November 1985. 
92loc. cit.
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94the USSR and Malaysia is very interested on this deal." Singapore
had had joint shipping repair ventures with the USSR for quite some
time. It might be recalled at this point in the discussion that the
USSR had been buying Philippine sugar, coconut oil, copra,
ready-to-wear garments, undergarments, cordage, tables, ropes, knives
and other products since 1975. On this basis, the Soviet officials
wanted to formalize and expand trade with the Philippines. It was
apparent, should trade expand, that the Soviet role in the economic
development of Southeast Asia would be easily enhanced. So far, the
only country with which it enjoys trade and technical relations is
Singapore. Singapore has a trading firm (Singapore Soviet Shipping)
and a small fish-processing plant (Marissco) ... Moscow's major
95involvement, though, is through the Moscow Narodny Bank.
Among the major reasons for the reluctance of the Philippines to 
push through many of the Soviet proposals had been the communist-led 
insurgency problems and also pressures from the Americans. In a 
hearing conducted by the Senate Select Committee in November 1985, the 
US made public an intelligence report that "the Soviet Union had begun 
positioning itself to offer support to communist insurgents" in the 
Philippines. It also pointed out that Moscow "had greatly enlarged its 
embassy in Manila and was making indirect contacts with the insurgents 
through Filipino labor unions affiliated with the Soviet-controlled 
World Federation of Trade Unions." The report further said that "the 
New People's Army (NPA) insurgency while basically an indigenous
rebellion, may now be forced by its growing numbers to look outside for
96arms and supplies."
94Bulletin Today, 3 November 1985.
95Far Eastern Economic Review, op. cit. , p.99. 
96Bulletin Today, 3 November 1985.
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This report, like previous ones, was denied by the Soviet Embassy 
in Manila. President Marcos also denied the report in an ABC 
television interview, saying
I do not believe there has been any increase in the 
personnel of the Russian embassy since they established their 
embassy here several years ago. We cannot confirm any attempt 
of the Russians trying to contact our insurgents.97
Acting Foreign Minister Pacifico Castro also said that "there were 
only 17 Soviet diplomats accredited by Manila at the moment and that 
not more than 37 may be assigned here at any one time . . . there has 
been no dramatic rise in the number of Soviet diplomats to indicate
Q Qincreasing Soviet intelligence-gathering activities here." The
Soviet embassy did not elaborate on the issue; it simply stated,
through First Secretary Victor Samoilenko, that "the statements of
President Marcos in the newspapers \are/ enough and more convincing
99than any embassy staff can give."
These statements were confirmed by Ambassador Yuri Sholmov of the 
Soviet embassy in Manila when he told Labor Minister Ople that it was 
the insurgents who made contacts but
The Soviet Union has rejected overtures for support made by 
purported representatives of the New People's Army to the 
Soviet embassy in Manila. To do otherwise would be a breach of 
existing covenants between the Soviet Union and the Philippines 
based on non-interference and mutual respect.190
Sholmov's statements were made on November 1985 before his 
departure from a four-year-and-three-months tour of duty in Manila. 
Sholmov further said: "we do not countenance proposals of this nature
97Bulletin Today, 6 November 1985. 
98Paily Express, 5 November 1985.
" Bulletin Today, 7 November 1985. 
100Bulletin Today, 25 December 1985.
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which contravene good relations with your great country."1^1
The NPA faction which allegedly contacted the Soviet embassy was 
one led by Rodolfo Salas, one of the organizers of the National 
Democratic Front (NDF). The NDF was said to be more Moscow-oriented 
than Peking-oriented. Even if Jose Ma. Sison, head of the Communist 
Party of the Philippines, denied reports that NDF sought assistance 
from the Soviet bloc, it appeared that it had done so as Ambassador 
Sholmov had stated. Sison was apparently ignored. Ross Munro, writing 
for Asian Wall Street Journal, made this assessment, on the basis of 
a personal interview with two insurgents, regarding the Soviet 
involvement in local communist subversive activities:
The question left hanging is whether the Soviets are
involved in the flow of foreign assistance to the Philippine 
communists. Since the 1981 arms shipment, which embarassed 
both the Soviets and the CPP leadership when it bacame public, 
not a single well-documented case of Soviet aid has surfaced. 
Rumours abound that Vietnam is helping the NPA, but no hard
evidence seems to exist. A strong circumstantial case is made
by some that at least a few of the radical and church 
organizations tunneling money from Europe to the Philippine 
communists must be controlled or bankrolled by Soviet agents.
But the most persuasive case that the Soviets have begun 
aiding the Philippine communists was made by two Filipinos in 
separate interviews this summer in Manila. Both are very
knowledgeable about what is going on inside the Communist 
Party. One is hostile to the CPP; the other one is very 
sympathetic. Both said that Moscow is split over how to handle 
the CPP.
On one side, according to both these sources, is the
International Department of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This organization usually 
takes the leading role in the Soviet Union's relations with
foreign communist parties. But afflicted with bureaucratic 
inertia, the International Department today is run by
conservatives who are comfortable with their decades-long ties 
to the old, pro-Moscow Communist Party in the Philippines, the 
PKP (which since the expulsion of Mr. Sison and his supporters 
in 1967 has been declining in size and influence in comparison 
with the CPP and whose existence today largely depends on 
Moscow's recognition of it as a fraternal Communist Party).
... \0n the other side/, the more pragmatic and energetic
101
102,loc. cit.'Ross H. Munro, 
(13-14 December 1985),
The New Rouge
p.8.
tf The Asian Wall Street Journal,
64
KGB shares neither the old loyalties nor the new qualms of the 
International Department . . . Recently, they say, the KGB has 
developed close relations with the CPP. The two sides are in 
frequent contacts with each other both in the Philippines and 
in abroad, but precisely what kind of business they are 
transacting is unknown.103
Indeed there were no documented evidences that the Soviets had 
given aid to the local communist insurgents. However, the rumours that 
appeared in newspapers from time to time about such aid, complemented 
by increasingly sustained guerilla activities, worried not only the 
Philippine government but also the United States because of the 
security of its military bases in the country. During Marcos regime, 
the insurgency problem did not affect Philippine-Soviet relations; in 
fact, it became closer by 1980-1985. The Soviet Union was the only 
country which acknowledged (albeit premature) Marcos as the 
legitimately elected president of the Philippines after the February 
1986 snap election.
Thus when Corazon Aquino was sworn in as president after Marcos
was deposed in 25 February 1986, RP-USSR relations became somewhat
strained. In an interview about the US-Philippine relations, Aquino
said: "I think we will develop stronger ties. I can see no reason why
two democracy-loving countries cannot maintain or even enhance better
relations."104 Asked about closer ties with the Soviet Union, the new
president replied: "I haven't even thought about them \the Soviets/,
i osespecially after they congratulated Mr. Marcos." It could be
anticipated therefore that the Aquino government would downgrade 
RP-USSR relations.
103Ross H. Munro, "Moscow on the Pasig" The Asian Wall Street Journal 
(16-19 December 1985), p.10.
104Business Day, 4 March 1986.
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CHAPTER 4
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The opening of diplomatic ties between the Philippines and the 
Soviet Union caused certain apprehensions within Southeast Asia and in 
the United States. The Western press, particularly American, has 
characterized it as a "sinister" move on the part of the Soviets to 
endanger American interests in the Philippines and to subvert peace and 
security in the region as well. Local press echoes this view.
While these views do not have empirical support nor necessarily 
historical justification, they have influenced the formation of two 
strategic perceptions. On the one hand, the United States had used 
these views as a perspective in discussing "the Soviet role" in Asia in 
a number of US Congressional Hearings on Foreign Affairs and in 
formulating foreign policy options. On the other hand, the Marcos 
government also used these views to suggest entering into some kind of 
modus vivendi with the Soviets if US Congress fail to provide the $900 
million rent on the bases.
Seen in this perspective, it is important that the Philippine-USSR 
relations be examined in their proper historical context in order to 
avoid errors in judgments and offer alternative suggestions as to how 
events, as available data show, should be interpreted. In this way 
also, we may be able to understand the nagging fears of many political 
analysts that the opening of the RP-USSR diplomatic relations endangers 
Philippine national security and that of the region of Southeast Asia
as a whole.
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4.1 General considerations
It would be an exaggeration to claim, in the absence of direct 
evidence, that the Philippines occupies a high level of interest in the 
USSR's policy in Southeast Asia. It is likewise an understatement to 
say that the Philippines is so insignificant to Soviet geopolitical 
interests in Southeast Asia as to merit no attention at all. The basic 
questions to ask therefore are: What influenced the USSR to become 
interested in the Philippines when for almost three decades, since 
1946, it had refused to recognize it as an independent state? What 
influenced the Philippines to encourage the opening of diplomatic ties 
with the USSR when the latter was one of the countries Filipino 
citizens were forbidden to visit?
Three factors appear to have influenced the opening of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries. First, the Soviet Union is, by 
geographical location, both an Asian and a European country. Although 
popularly identified with Europe, it is territorially the largest 
country in Asia and is also one of the most populous. It has a 
maritime border with Japan, and land borders with six other Asian 
countries (North Korea, China, Outer Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iran and 
Turkey), and one of its relatively small number of Allies, Vietnam, is 
located in Southeast Asia. It is thus understandable why the Soviet 
Union considers political events in Asia and Southeast Asia as 
important to its interests and in some cases, to its national security. 
Second, the Philippines is the only country in Southeast Asia which 
houses two large US military bases. It is understandable why the USSR 
is interested in the Philippines just as the US is concerned about the 
Soviet presence in Vietnam or Cuba. And third, the Philippines 
encouraged the opening of diplomatic ties with the USSR because the 
latter is viewed as one of the alternative markets for Philippine 
export goods and a source of future technical assistance.
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4.2 Particular considerations
Comparatively, the first factor, that of geographical location is 
not very significant insofar as Philippine-USSR relations are 
concerned. The archipelago plays no role in posing a threat to the 
Soviet home territory. The second factor, presence of US bases, has 
some importance, but is now to some degree offset by Soviet bases in 
Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. The third factor was the most crucial in 
opening diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Starting in 1964, indirect overtures for diplomatic relations were 
hinted at in the Philippine media. Manila was visited by Soviet 
delegates who attended an international seminar on foreign trade. 
Similarly, Filipino businessmen who later became legislators visited 
Moscow on economic missions. The impact of these visits dramatized the 
need to expand Philippine export markets in order to cushion the 
effects of the termination of preferential trade with the United States 
under the Laurel-Langley Agreeement of 1954, which was scheduled to end 
in 1974. In other words, the decision was one of economic survival.
The decision bore fruit because in 1974, when the United States 
refused to accept Philippine sugar on the basis of the old preferential 
relations, it was the Eastern European countries which absorbed the 
product. Similarly, when Japan in the same year refused Philippine 
copper, inspite of contracts, because world prices fell, it was the 
Eastern European countries which bought it. In other words, the 
positive reactions of the Eastern European bloc countries encouraged 
the Philippine government to hasten the opening of diplomatic ties with 
the USSR in 1976.
Undoubtedly, the ease with which diplomatic relations with the 
USSR were established, was also heavily influenced by the changes made 
in Philippine foreign policy, even as early as 1968. Drastic measures 
like liberalization of travel to communist countries were implemented,
68
and Marcos started to move Philippine foreign policy away from its too 
American-centric orientation. This was in line with his desire to 
expand the horizon of Philippine foreign relations to include 
establishing diplomatic ties with all countries, regardless of 
ideological differences.
This attempt to be independent was fraught with formidable 
psychological and political barriers. Public opinion had been led to 
believe that diplomatic ties were reserved only for friends and denied 
to enemies. For years the Filipinos were conditioned to think of the 
Soviet Union as an enemy. The influence of the US containment policies 
(first, with China, now, with USSR) on the conduct of Philippine 
diplomacy is deep-seated. American policies were always taken into 
serious consideration in formulating Philippine foreign policies. 
Thus, when Marcos forced the issue of normalizing ties with the Soviet 
Union he was criticized not only by the Americans but also by Filipino 
leaders. In fact, it was the Americans who were frightened by the 
consequences of the ties with the USSR.
Nevertheless, Marcos was determined to prepare the psychological 
and political grounds for the eventual opening of formal relations. He 
initiated a broad program intended to gain wider publicity and to ride 
high on the emerging nationalism which has for its target, the 
so-called American imperialism. Thus the first thing he did after his 
election in 1965 was to announce that he was considering opening 
relations with the USSR, pointing out the parochiality, if not 
absurdity, of the old policies. He then sent several missions to 
Moscow to make contacts with Soviet leaders on the possibility of 
establishing trade agreements. He also made effective use of the 
cultural exchange programs to soften the psychological barrier at home 
and to build acceptability in Moscow.
The political and psychological barriers having been transcended,
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the formal signing of the documents on diplomatic ties was "ripe". 
Marcos went to Moscow in 1976 accompanied by Mrs. Marcos and other 
government officials. The document was signed, and also other 
documents of relationships. During the occasion, the Soviet leaders 
assured Marcos that they would increase their volume of trade with the 
Philippines and diversify its composition. Thus began the formal 
relations with the Soviet Union and the independent posture of the 
Philippine government in the conduct of its foreign affairs, away from 
the former American-centric diplomacy.
4.3 Implications for national security
The entry of the Soviet Union into the Philippines challenged US 
prestige and ability to keep its former colony and staunch ally away 
from Soviet influence. Insofar as the US is concerned, this is a 
threat to the security of its military bases, not of espionage but of 
possible eviction and perhaps ultimate Soviet takeover, as happened to 
Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. It "proved" to American analysts, in recent 
years, that the USSR had systematically laid the groundwork for its 
military activities in the ASEAN region. First, it had gained access 
to Vietnam (in Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang). Second, it has opened 
diplomatic ties with the Philippines. Should the Philippine government 
refuse to renegotiate the bases agreement due to terminate in 1991, it 
would be easier for the Soviets to take over. After Vietnam, the US is 
morally at a disadvantage insofar as world opinion is concerned if it 
insists on retaining foreign bases when the host government wants the 
bases abolished. In other words, the so-called national security 
problem associated with the opening of diplomatic ties with the USSR is 
not a Philippine problem; it is a US problem.
The Philippines has no military base of its own that would attract 
the Soviets. Nevertheless, it is strategically located at the northern
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choke-point of the South China Sea. Thus if the Americans are pushed 
out of the archipelago by anti-American feelings and possible success 
of the communist-led National People's Army, Clark air field base and 
Subic naval base are prized gains. If this scenario is correct, then 
the Americans would try everything to "destabilize" any future 
Philippine political regime which looked likely to make this 
frightening event happen.
In fact, it is this line of thinking which made the Americans so 
"panicky" about the Soviet's increasing participation in the economic 
development of the Philippines since 1980. One example is the Semirara 
Cement Company project planned in 1982 and to be implemented in 1983, 
after a thorough feasibility study. The project was to have the full 
financial backing of the USSR. As plans on the project were being laid 
out, the US Congress Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs focused 
one of its hearings on the security significance of the Semirara 
project to US interests in the Philippines. Eventually, the project 
was abandoned, and no reason was given for its cancellation.
The other threat to American interests in the Philippines is the 
growing menace of the communist-led New People's Army. Local and 
foreign estimates of the number of the NPA's armed personnel vary. 
This is not important. What is important is that, in the American 
perception, the NPA is capable of destabilizing the Philippine 
government. For one thing, the Philippine army has not been effective 
in anti-insurgency campaigns. The Marcos government had lost its 
credibility; graft and corruption were rampant, and protest 
demonstrations a daily phenomenon. The resentment over the presence of 
the American bases and multinationals was growing and Marcos appeared 
to have done nothing, inspite of American protests "to mute these 
developments."1
*US Congressional Subcommittee Hearings* (1983), op. cit.
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Meanwhile, Marcos intensified Philippine relations with the Soviet 
Union. Mrs. Marcos, as the president's envoy, continued to visit 
Moscow and to win Soviet support for her cultural projects. That 
Marcos was playing the "Russian card" to make Washington accede to his 
demands regarding the rent of the American bases in the country 
surfaced in 1983 when he warned that "if the US cannot pay the full 
rent due on the bases, then the Americans can get out."3 He further 
said that perhaps he could interest the Soviets to take over the 
military facilities.3
It is apparent, by now, that Marcos did not succeed in using the 
Russian card against the Americans. It can be inferred from what 
happened during the snap election on 7 February 1986 that the Americans 
had decided that Marcos had to go. On 25 February 1986 after the 
controversial election, Marcos was deposed by his defense minister, 
Juan Ponce-Enrile, and vice-chief of staff, Lt. General Fidel Ramos in 
a "people's power" revolution which took place a few hours after 
President Reagan's chief negotiator Habib left the country.
For the Americans, the threat was removed. Everything is now 
expected to go back to normal.
The new Philippine president Corazon Aquino was displeased by the 
way the Soviet Union reacted to the election.4 During the crisis, only 
the Soviet Union seemed to have supported the election of Marcos as 
valid and legitimate.5 It reportedly sent a congratulatory message to 
Marcos through incoming envoy Vadim Shabalin. This has been denied, 
however, by the Soviet embassy in Manila. Embassy sources told a local 
daily that Shabalin only gave oral congratulations out of "diplomatic
pBusiness Day, March 13, 1983.
3Ibid.
business Day, 4 March 1986.5
This is implicit in press releases from Moscow. See Appendix E.
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politeness" when he presented his credentials to Marcos.
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet sent a congratulatory message 
to President Aquino expressing the hope that "friendly relations will
ncontinue." This was followed by the visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign 
Minister Mikhail Kapitsa who met President Aquino several weeks later. 
He said: "We have guarantees from the former government that it will 
not allow the Americans to have stores of nuclear weaponry at these 
bases \Clark air base and Subic naval base/," and added that "we hope 
the \new/ government of the Philippines will look after that."* 78
On the whole, however, it could be anticipated that 
Philippine-Soviet relations would be downgraded under the Aquino 
government. The basic reason would be the perception of the new 
government that the Soviets have been pro-Marcos right up to the end. 
Furthermore, when asked about the possibility of a similarly close 
relationship with the Soviet Union as with the United States, Aquino 
said: "I guess I can't be close to both. That would be wishful 
thinking that you could possibly be close to the two supercontenders."9
With the departure of Marcos, Philippine-Soviet relations suffered 
a set-back. What lies ahead of the relationship depends on the future 
developments in the country. On the basis of current trends, it would 
apparently remain civil but less dramatic or ebullient than during the 
Marcos years.
^Business Day, 13 March 1986.
7 Ibid.
8Business Day, 30 April 1986.
9Business Day, 4 March 1986.
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APPENDIX A
RP-USSR JOINT COMMUNIQUE
Following is the text of the Joint Communique signed in Moscow 2 
June 1976 by President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Supreme Soviet Presidium
President Nikolai Podgorny:
RP-USSR Joint Communique
On the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic 
of the Philippines and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, guided 
by the desire to develop friendly relations and cooperation between the 
two countries in various fields, have decided to estab- lish diplomatic 
relations from the date of the signature of this Joint Communique and 
exchange of diplomatic missions at the level of embassies.
Both parties reaffirm that the relations between the Republic of 
the Philippines and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be 
based on the principles of peaceful co-existence: mutual respect for
each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in 
each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Both parties are 
confident that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
Republic of the Philippines and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
is the interest of both countries and will promote and strengthen 
internatoinal cooperation and universal peace.
The Republic of the Philippines and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics have agreed that the exchange of diplomatic missions between 
them will take place at the earliest possible date. They will render
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each other the necessary assistance in the establishment of diplomatic 
missions in their respective capitals and in the performance of their 
functions in accordance with international practice and the principle
of reciprocity. 
Moscow, 2 June 1976
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF THE 
PHILIPPINES:
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS (Sgd.) N.V. PODGORNY
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APPENDIX B
TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereinafter 
referred to as the Contracting parties;
Desiring to develop and strengthen direct trade and economic 
relations between them in accordance with the development and trade 
needs and objectives of their respective countries on equitable and 
mutually beneficial bases; and,
Recognizing that favorable conditions exist for the development of 
trade and economic relations between the Republic of the Philip- pines 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
The Contracting Parties shall promote the development of trade and 
economic relations between them within the framework of laws and
regulations effective in either country.
ARTICLE 2
Each Contracting Party shall grant the other, most-favoured­
nation treatment in all matters relating to:
(a) Customs duties and charges of any kind including method 
of levying such duties and charges imposed on or in 
connection with importation or exportation, or imposed 
on the transfer of payment for imports or exports;
(b) Rules, formalities, and charges connected with customs
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clearance;
(c) All internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind 
imposed on or in connection with imported and exported 
products; and
(d) Issuance of import and export licenses.
ARTICLE 3
The provisions of Article 2 shall not apply to:
(a) Tariff preferences or other advantages which either 
Contracting Party grants or may grant to neigboring 
countries to facilitate border trade; and
(b) Tariff preferences or other advantages which the 
Republic of the Philippines may grant to developing 
countries under any trade expansion or economic 
cooperation scheme.
ARTICLE 4
The Contracting Parties, subject to and in accordance with the 
laws and regulations in force in either countries shall facilitate 
export from and import into their countries of goods mentioned in List 
A and B attached to this Agreement (Annexes I and II respectively). 
The said List A and B could be amended and supplemented by mutual
agreement of the Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 5
The import and export of the goods stipulated in Article 4 will be 
carried out in accordance with the laws and rules in force in either 
country affecting export, import and foreign exchange, based on 
commercial transactions concluded between Philippine juridical and 
natural persons licensed to perform import and export operations on the 
one side, and the Soviet foreign trade organisations on the other, and 
on the basis of mutually acceptable current prices of the main world 
markets for the corresponding goods.
ARTICLE 6
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The Contracting Parties shall facilitate the conclusion of 
long-term contracts for the delivery of machinery and equipment and 
other goods from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the 
Republic of the Philippines to the Unoin of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
including processed and semi-processed products, on the basis of their 
respective reuirements and possibilities in trade in various kinds of 
energy, and economic development.
Machinery and equipment, including complete projects may also be 
delivered from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Republic 
of the Philippines on deferred payment and other special terms and 
conditions to be stipulated by the Contracting Parties in separate 
agreements.
ARTICLE 7
Juridical and natural persons of either country shall enjoy most 
favoured-nation treatment; on the basis of full reciprocity with 
respect to protection of their persons and property in the course of 
their commercial activities in the territory of the other country, 
provided that the enjoyment of this treatment shall be subject to the 
laws, rules and regulations of the other country.
ARTICLE 8
In order to develop further trade between the two countries, the 
Contracting Parties shall facilitate each other's participation in 
trade fairs to be held in either country, and in arranging exhibitions 
of either country in the territory of the other, on terms to be agreed 
between their competent authorities.
The exemption from customs duties and other similar charges of 
articles and samples intended for fairs and exhibitions, as well as the 
sale and disposition, shall be subject to the laws, rules and 
regulation of the country where such fairs and exhibitions are held.
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ARTICLE 9
Each Contracting Party reserves to its own vessels the right to 
engage in national and coastal navigation and fishing.
Mercantile cargo ships of either country shall enjoy with respect 
to entry, stay in and departure from the ports of the other country 
most-favoured-nation facilities granted by its respective laws, rules 
and regulations.
ARTICLE 10
All current payments between the two countries shall be made in 
freely convertible currency, subject to the foreign exchange 
regulations effective in either country.
This does not, however, preclude the conclusion of other payment
arrangements to facilitate trade if the Contracting Parties so agree.
ARTICLE 11
The goods delivered in accordance with the present Agreement may 
be re-exported to third countries only prior agreement between the 
competent authorities of Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 12
The provision of the present Agreement shall not limit the right 
of either Contracting Party to adopt or execute measures:
(a) for reasons of public health, morals, order or security;
(b) for the protection of plants and animals against diseases; 
and
(c) to safeguard its exteranl financial position and balance 
of payments.
ARTICLE 13
Each Contracting Party may, on the basis of reciprocity establish 
in Metropolitan Manila and Moscow respectively, its Trade 
Representation. The legal virtue of such Representation shall be 
determined by the provisions of Annex III which shall form an intergral 
part of the present Agreement.
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ARTICLE 14
All disputes relating to any commercial transaction concluded in 
accordance with the present Agreement which cannot be settle amicably 
shall be resolved in accordance with the arbitration procedures 
provided for in the contracts.
ARTICLE 15
The contracting parties upon request by either of them, shall, in 
the spirit of mutual understanding, discuss and adopt measures aimed at 
broader trade and economic relations, the attainment of the objectives 
of this Agreement and the solution of problems connected with the 
practical implementation of this Agreement.
ARTICLE 16
The provision of this Agreement shall continue to be applied after 
it has expired to all commercial transactions concluded but not fully
performed before the termination of this Agreement.
ARTICLE 17
This Agreement shall come into force on the date of its signature 
and shall operate over a period of one year.
Upon the expiry of the said period, the Agreement shall 
automatically continue to be valid for subsequent periods of one year 
each unless either Contracting Party notified in writing the other of 
its intention to terminate the Agreement not less than six (6) months 
prior to the expiry of each one year period.
IN WITNESS HEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries duly
authorised by the respective governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE in Moscow on June 2, 1976, in two original copies, each in 
the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
(SGD.) CESAR VIRATA (SGD.) N.S. PATOLICHEV
For the Government of 
the Republic of the 
Philippines
For the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics
LIST "A"
PHILIPPINE PRODUCTS FOR EXPORT TO THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
RAW MATERIALS:
Nickel
Copper Concentrates, Blisters, Ingots and Wirebars
Chromite Ore
Magnetite
Sugar
Coconut Products 
Coconut Oil 
Desiccated Coconut
Copra Cake or Meal 
Coconut Coir 
Abaca Ptoducts
Tobacco and Tobacco Manufactures 
Leaf Tobacco
Cigars, Cigarillos and Cheroots 
Crumb Rubber 
Fruits and Vegetables
Tropical Fresh Fruits (Bananas) 
Juices and Concentrates 
Preserved Fruits
Beer
Rum and Gin 
Tropical Fruit Wine 
Other Food Products 
Shrimps and Prawns 
Tuna
Other Fish and Fish Products
Manufactured Products:
Wood Manufactures
Veneer of Hard Wood Species 
Plywood, Non-Coniferous 
Veneer Sheets and Corestock 
Furniture and Fixtures 
Builder's Woodwork 
Other Wood Products 
Woven and Knitted Fabrics 
Garments
Outerwear, Woven and Knitted 
Undergarments, Woven and knitted 
Hosiery
Gloves and Mittens 
Of Leather 
Of Textile Materials 
Cordage, Cables and Twines 
Footwear, Rubber and Leather 
Ceramic Products 
Glazed Tiles 
Bathroom Fixtures 
Activated Carbon
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Paper Products 
Handicrafts 
Crude Glycerine
Carpets and Carpeting Materials 
Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Products
LIST "B"
PRODUCTS FOR EXPORT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Metal Cutting Machine Tools
Forging and Pressing Equipment
Power Generation Equipment
Electrical Equipment
Welding Equipment
Mining Equipment
Crushing and Milling Equipment
Metallurgical Equipment
Oil Drilling Equipment
Hoisting and Handling Equipment
Equipment for the Chemical Industry
Equipment for the Building Industry
Equipment for the Food Industry
Equipment for the Light Industry
Equipment for the Printing Industry
Road-Building Machines
Pumping and Compressing Equipment
Medical Equipment and Tools
Tools
Accessories and Pittings 
Abrasives
Technological Equipment for the Electronics Industry
Communications Equipment
tiarine Equipment
instruments
Laboratory Equipment
Tractors and Agricultural Machines
Transportation Means (Railway, Marine, Air)
Various Machines and Equipment
Spare Parts for Machinery and Equipment Supplied
Coal
Oil
Coke
Cast Iron 
Ferro Alloys 
Zinc
Aluminium 
Asbestos 
Ferrous Metals 
Long-Staple Pulp 
Nickel 
Magnesium
Mineral Fertilizers 
Chemical Products 
Synthetic Rubber 
Cotton
Products of Tibet Medicine
Caviar
Vodka
Canned Fish
Platinum
Palladium
Brilliants and Jewelries 
Building Materials 
Handicrafts
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APPENDIX C
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE 
PHILIPPINES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST 
REPUBLICS ON CULTURAL COOPERATION
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the 
Government of theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics hereinafter 
referred to as the Contracting Parties, desirous of expanding cultural 
ties between the two countries and of strengthening the friendly 
relations existing between the people of the Philippines and the Soviet 
Union, have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
The Contracting Parties agree to develop ties and cooperation in 
the fields of culture, higher or post-graduate education and sports 
between the two countries on the basis of mutual respect for the 
principles of sovereignty, equality and non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs and in conformity with the laws, rules and
regulations in force in their respective countries.
ARTICLE 2
The Contracting Parties will promote cooperation in the field of 
education through exchanges of professors and teachers of higher 
educational institutions for lectures on subjects to be agreed upon as 
well as by granting scholarships for the study at higher or 
post-graduate levels.
ARTICLE 3
The Contracting Parties will, in conformity with the laws and
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regulations of their respective countries, endeavor to accord each 
other appropriate opportunities in the field of culture through mutual 
visits of literary writers, painters, sculptors, composers and
musicians, individual and group performers, and other cultural 
representatives.
ARTICLE 4
The Contracting Parties agree, in conformity with the laws and 
regulations of their respective countries to encourage exchanges of:
1. Books and periodicals on art, music and literary works.
2. Cinematographic films and recordings on art, music, history 
and literary works.
3. Art and other cultural exhibitions.
ARTICLE 5
The Contracting Parties will encourage the establishment of 
contacts between their national libraries, museums and other similar 
institu- tions in order to exchange materials relating to arts and 
literature.
ARTICLE 6
The Contracting Parties will promote the study of each other's 
languages and literature at appropriate educational institutions 
through exchanges of higher or post-graduate students and professors, 
organization of special courses and seminars on the above-mentioned
levels as well as through exchanges of ii texture and study materials.
ARTICLE 7
The Contracting Parties will study the possibility of conducting
an agreement on cooperation in the field of radio and television.
ARTICLE 8
The Contracting Parties will promote exchanges in the field of 
sports and physical education and encourage to this end the holding of 
athletic meets and competitions on the basis of reciprocal invitations.
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ARTICLE 9
In order to implement the present Agreement Parties will elaborate 
working programs of cooperation subject to mutual agreement which will
also provide for financial arrangements.
ARTICLE 10
Supplementary agreements necessary for the implementation of 
provisions of the present Agreement will be in the case of each item of
implementation, done through official channels.
ARTICLE 11
Any questions that may arise in connection with the interpretation 
of the present Agreement will be resolved by the Contracting Parties 
through diplomatic channels.
ARTICLE 12
This Agreement shall enter into force on the day the Contracting
Parties inform each other of its approval in accordance with the
existing internal legislation of each of the Parties. It shall remain
in force for a period of two years and thereafter until one of the
Parties informs the other Party by written notification at least six
months prior to the expiry fo the initial two-year period or any time
thereafter of its intention to terminate this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Contracting Parties have signed this
Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.
DONE in Moscow in duplicate this 7th day of July 1978, in the
Pilipino, Russian and English languages, all texts being equally valid.
For the Government of the For the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
(Sgd.) IMELDA R. MARCOS (Sgd.) ANDREI GROMYKO
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APPENDIX D
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE 
PHILIPPINES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST 
REPUBLICS FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desirous of 
developing cooperation between the two countries particularly in the 
field of science and technology, conscious of mutual benefit to the two 
countries derived from the development of their scientific and 
technological relations, taking into account the fact that the 
implementation of such cooperation will contribute to the development 
of mutual understanding between the peoples of the Republic of the 
Philippines and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and to the 
growing friendly relations between the two countries.
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
The Contracting Parties shall promote the development of 
scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries in 
all spheres of mutual interest on the principle of equality and mutual 
benefit. On mutual consent the Parties shall define the areas of such
cooperation taking account of prevailing possibilities.
ARTICLE 2
Scientific and technological cooperation will be carried out in 
the following basic forms:
exchange of scientists, specialists and representatives of 
industrial and trade organizations interested in scientific and 
technological cooperation.
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exchange of technical documentation and information, 
arrangement of bilateral conference and symposia on subjects 
of mutual interest.
other forms of cooperation in the field of science and 
technology.
ARTICLE 3
The Contracting Parties shall encourage the establishment of 
scientific and technological contacts between the appropriate 
organizations, agencies, universities and firms in both countries and, 
as mutual needs arise, the conclusion of separate agreements. Such 
agreements shall be concluded in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of the two countries.
ARTICLE 4
The present Agreement does not exclude the visits and exchanges of 
specialists in the area of science and technology outside the 
programmes of scientific and technological cooperation agreed upon 
under the present Agreement.
ARTICLE 5
To implement this Agreement, representatives of the two Parties 
shall meet, whenever necessary, to negotiate the programmes and approve 
the areas and terms of scientific and technological cooperation, the 
ways and meaans for accomplishing the agreed items of the programmes
and to discuss other issues relative to the present Agreement.
ARTICLE 6
The present Agreement shall enter into force when the Contracting 
Parties inform each other through diplomatic channels that they 
fulfilled the obligations of their internal legal measures in
connection with the approval and ratification of bilateral 
international agreements. It shall be valid for a period of five (5) 
years and shall continue in force thereafter, unless terminated by 
either government through a six month prior written notice.
Done in duplicate in Moscow on 8 July 1982 in English and Russian 
languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
(Sgd.) IMELDA R. MARCOS (sgd.) GURY IVANOVICH MARCHUK
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APPENDIX E
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCAST: THE USSR
Philippines Presidential Elections
(a) Soviet television 1600 gmt 9 Feb 86
Text of report by V. Solovyev in “ International panorama” programme presented by 
Nikolay Shishlin:
[Shishlin, after reference to Portuguese elections] We saw something similar a 
few days ago in the Philippines, where presidential elections took place on 7th bebruary.
However, in the course of such a bitter 57-day election campaign dozens of people were 
killed, dozens injured, there were disturbances. There were, of course, intrigues and 
forgeries. In some localities the number of registered voters was ten times in excess of the 
number of residents in those localities. However, it is alleged that all this is the norm in 
the Philippines.
[Solovyev] On 7th February the noise of the political struggle subsided 
momentarily in the Philippines. Electrified by election speeches, some 26,000,000 
Filipinos decided the fate of their country on that day. Now even a single ballot paper 
could decide the country’s future for the first time after many years of authoritarian 
regime. Transparent urns were installed at polling stations and voting took place only in 
daytime hours in order to rule out cheating of any kind. In a word, everything connected 
with the elections was to take place in the public eye on the election day. Of the 29 
candidates there were only two real claimants for power - Ferdinand Marcos, since 1965 
continuously president of the country, and Corazon Aquino, never involved in politics 
before. However, right on the eve of the elections, she was heading the united nationalist 
democratic opposition bloc. Three years ago her husband, Benigno Aquino, a former 
senator, was murdered. He was the most well-known figure among the bourgeois 
opposition, and consequently he was considered the most dangerous rival in the fight for 
presidential power. The violent death surrounded his name with a martyr’s halo, and the 
family of Aquino became one of the most popular in the Philippines. Since the time of 
his death, the political life of the country has become even more tense. And today, there 
is scarcely a Filipino who is unconcerned about it. [Video: crowds out to watch election 
motorcade; transparent urn; electoral registers, Aquino-Laurel election meeting]
The USA is also not unconcerned as regards the fate of the Philippines. The 
Philippines’ links with the USA are close and traditionally close. And this tradition dates 
back to olden times. In 1904 this archipelago in the Pacific Ocean was seized by enter­
prising Americans and turned into a US colony. Prior to this the Philippines had managed 
to come under the colonial oppression of Spain, which continued for more than 300 
years. The very advantageous strategic position of the archipelago at the crossroads o f the 
route from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific was always an amazingly tempting bait for the 
military. And today, despite the fact that the present age is that of missiles, the 
importance of the archipelago has not diminished in the least: a unique staging post from 
one hemisphere to the other, a halting place on the US route to Asia, a connecting valve 
between the base on Guam on Hawaii in the Pacific Ocean and the base on the island of 
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean - this is what the Philippines are on Pentagon official 
maps. The USA now has some of its largest bases on foreign territory here - the naval base 
of Subic Bay and the air base of Clark Field. It is here that there are some of the largest 
stores of nuclear and chemical weapons of the USA abroad. It is difficult to overestimate 
their importance in US strategists’ plans. [Video: panoramic views of islands, coastal 
settlements; US naval vessels cruising, fighters taking off and landing on aircraft carrier]
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. The military links are supplemented by economic links. The population of the 
Philippines is 55,000,000 people, they are hardworking and exceptionally benevolent 
people. However, US capital renders the majority of them virtually without rights. Some 
of the largest US monopolies keep the country stubbornly in their power. Branches of 
them pump huge profits out of the Philippines, and replace it with poverty. The state 
debt is in excess of 26,000 million dollars - a huge debt for a country of this size. The 
debts and interest on it are bleeding the country’s economy white. The gross national 
product has gone down by 10% over two years. However, the dictatorship of some of the 
largest banks, the International Monetary Fund included, is absolute. The Philippines 
have now received a credit of 3,000 million dollars, and some of this money will go for 
the setting up of a special fund for private employers. This fund will grant them credit for 
buying up state enterprises.
The USA’s interference in the internal affairs of the Philippines is abhorrent, its 
ultimate goal is to reduce us to the position of a helpless colony which could be led by 
the nose, the Manila ‘Daily Express’ said on the eve of the elections. This is becoming 
unbearable, virtually all presidential candidates have said, commenting on the US attitude 
specifically on the present situation and on the country in general, In Washington,
however, they say (?disingenuously): We are here because we have been here, and simply 
because we are here. So it is really simply, to think in imperial terms, what one might say 
about the Philippines in Washington. And to the growing demands, for example, from 
Filipinos to remove the military bases from the country, Washington replies: the bases 
will remain on the Philippines for as long as it is in our interests. And so that there could 
be no doubts about this, a flagship rocket cruiser and a pair of the largest aircraft carriers 
o f the US Seventh Pacific Fleet paid a visit to their Philippines base for election day.
All the same, Americans have not been able to conceal their alarm about the 
future of the country. The first thing that their country gave to the Philippines was an 
invisible but quite large army of quiet Americans, who landed on all inhabited islands of 
the Archipelago. All possible rumours, forgeries and bribes are their work. And finally, 
the arrival of highly-placed Americans, Congress and State Department delegations and so 
on and so forth, as observers of the course of the election. The Filipinos have christened 
their descent thus - political intervention. We are absolutely neutral, the White House 
says. But who will believe this if the Philippines are declared a “sphere of US vital 
interests” by the selfsame White House.
Furthermore, something else is well known. On the eve of the national 
presidential elections, some Filipinos were demanding the annexation of the country to 
the USA as the 51st state. This movement has found support with Tolentino, who is 
standing from the ruling party for the post of Vice-President and is a former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. However, the Americans are against this. As the 51st state the Philippines 
would be a superfluous burden. Much, very much, if not all, is being done in the 
Philippines at Washington’s bidding. Incidentally, the decision to hold early presidential 
elections was made under pressure from Washington. And Manila does not conceal this. 
[Video: high-rise developments; street scenes; peasant working rudimentary plough pulled 
by animal; poor Filipinos squatting by roadside; shots of Ramon Durano home for aged; 
other Durano-owned enterprises; man handing out bank notes to crowds; shanty towns]
As a result of the early elections which have been held the Americans are hoping 
to strengthen their present and ensure their future on the Philippines. However, this 
country belongs to the Filipinos themselves, and sooner or later, it is precisely they who 
should be its master.
(b) Moscow “World Service” in English 0800 gmt 10 Feb 86 
Text of report:
A demonstration against US interference in the internal affairs of the Philippines 
has been held in Manila. Demonstrators picketed the hotel where a group of so-called 
American observers of last week’s presidential elections were staying. In addition to these 
observers the USA has sent warships to the region. Meanwhile vote counting continues in 
the capital. Today it is being conducted by the National Assembly that is to announce 
the official results of the elections. The contenders to the post are the present head of 
state, Ferdinand Marcos, and a representative of the bourgeois opposition, Mrs Corazon 
Aquino.
SWB SU/8180/A3/2 11 Feb 86
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US “Campaign o f  Interference” in Philippines
(a) Soviet television 1548 gmt 17 Feb 86
Text of ‘The world today” commentary by Igor Kudrin (SU/8183/A3/7):
Nor is it calm in the Philippines, where the presidential elections have not 
relieved the situation. President Marcos does not conceal his satisfaction at his victory,
and has said that he is prepared to reach a reasonable political compromise with the 
opposition. But the leader of the opposition, Corazon Aquino, who was defeated, is 
trying to dispute the results of the voting. She asserts that the counting of the votes was 
conducted in violation of regulations On the central square in Manila there was a mass 
demonstration by Aquino supporters, who are threatening to paralyse the country with a 
general strike,
Washington clearly wishes that passions should subside as quickly as possible, 
that everything would remain as before, and - the main thing - that American interests 
should not suffer, that its military and economic interests should not suffer This is why 
Philip Habib, the special envoy of President Reagan, has arrived urgently in the 
Philippines. Incidentally, certain observers think that this visit could play not a peace­
making role, but, on the contrary, could do harm and exacerbate the situation even 
further. In this connection, it is worth recalling the arrival of a group of American 
observers for the elections, the Pentagon's promise to send to the Philippines military 
advisers, the US President’s words about the particular importance of the American 
military bases in that country and, finally, the promise to give the Philippines fresh aid 
provided, of course, they continue to respect American interests in the future too.
(b) Tass in English (i) 1553 (ii) 1629 and (iii) 1633 gmt 17 Feb 86
(i) Text of Washington report:
An anti-Philippine campaign is gaining momentum in the USA, with many 
influential newspapers publishing biased and sometimes blatantly provocative stories 
about the situation in the Philippines.
Democratic Senators David Boren, Carl Levin and David Pryor, just back from 
a trip to that country, held a news conference during which, according to press reports, 
they urged President Reagan to act without delay and compel Ferdinand Marcos to 
resign.
(ii) Text of Rome report:
Pope John Paul II has joined in the US campaign of interference in the internal 
affairs of the Philippines.
The newspaper ‘La Stampa’ reported that he voiced approval for the decision 
by the leadership of the Philippine Catholic Church to support the opposition against the 
ruling coalition led by Ferdinand Marcos.
The paper said the Pontiff is showing “a direct interest in the situation in the 
Philippines following the presidential elections” .
(iii) Text of Manila report:
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos met in secrecy today with the visiting 
special envoy of the US President, Philip Habib, who will later hold talks with opposition 
leader Corazon Aquino and Cardinal Jaime Sin, head of the Catholic Church.
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The press believes that Habib’s mission is to reconcile the ODDOsine sides and 
resuhs “Nati° Ml Un“ y” 8OTer"ment- **
- >ä vä  “ s  rÄ  p£
d E o ted k n « ”Ctc^D afi51C^  rh5UltS||aIfd “ lnouna'd Plam t0 launch a nationwide “civU nee campaign which will further aggravate the already unstable situation.
was DrenJJef m8 cL I T ’ ,0'eign J?ur"al,s's here- Ma,cos said his admuustration 
comnromS B h™H^H T ,  p'°Posals ^  lhe opposition foi a sensible political:& Ä tftÄ B s:r«tes3!
(c) Moscow home service 1745 gmt 17 Feb 86
L^hi:°f “Internatlonal diary ; -e n ts , facts, opinions” commentary presented by Viktor
. • A ♦<k ^ ereut situati° n “  taking shape in the Philippines, As you obviously already
know in the night towards Sunday the National Assembly proclaimed Marcos the
feTd^ of thd ° f SU v  aS ^  T imier ° f ^  PresidentiaI elections. However, Aquino’ the
£ elecuom weTforged. ^  ' eC0EniSe *“ * deCiS'0n' that ,he results of
As Reuter reports, on Monday Habib, a special representative of the US
fhTrnn Aq’£/1° ■ A Marcos spokesman stated that during
the conversation Habib gave Marcos the assurance that the USA has no intention of 
interfering in the mternal affairs of the Philippines.
fa c ts  t ^ i S a ^  f “ ernem ««ects the Fihpmos’ wishes rather than the true 
facts. The USA has not only dispatched to the Philippines a group of so-called election 
observers but has also brought up its warships to the shores of the republic. The USA 
fears for the fate of its bases on the Philippines and this determines its actions.
SWB SU/8187/A3/2 19 Feb 86
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Situation in the Philippines “Aggravated by US Interference”
(a) Soviet television 1500 gmt 23 Feb 86
Text of “International Panorama” commentary presented by Boris Kalyagin:
In the Philippines the election results have been reckoned up, but the political 
situation remains unclear. Corazon Aquino, leader of the opposition, has announced that 
the officially declared results are invalid. The situation has been complicated by an 
attempt at a military overthrow. It was undertaken by Enrile, Minister of National 
Defence of the Philippines, and Lt-Gen Ramos, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the 
General Staff of the Armed Forces. Along with the support of some sub-units of troops, 
they seized the building of the Ministry of DEfence and the headquarters of the police 
and demanded that President Marcos should leave his post. At the same time the 
President himself announced that other senior military chiefs were standing by the 
government. Marcos said that his government was monitoring the situation in the country 
and proposed that the mutineers should lay down their arms in order to avoid bloodshed.
It is typical that the conspirators informed Bosworth, US ambassador to the 
Philippines, of their actions straightaway. I would not have been surprised to find out 
that the US ambassador had been told of the plot beforehand, such is the really too 
suspicious fuss that Washington has started around the Philippines. Dozens o f American 
observers have paid a visit to this country recently. Habib, personal envoy of the White 
House, who tried to play the role of mediator in Manila between the government and the 
opposition was also there. Video: Kalyagin reads commentary over clips showing Cory 
Aquino, troops in corridor, outside of police headquarters, press conference with Enrile 
and Ramos, Marcos addressing press, helicopter landing, street scenes, Habib received by 
Marcos.
But the US Senate has altogether adopted a resolution, essentially declaring that 
it does not acknowledge the Filipino election results, a case almost unprecedented in 
international relations. This demonstrative gesture, of course, inspired the conspirators. 
According to the British ‘Financial Times’ the White House is haunted by the nightmare 
of the Filipino elections. It would be naive however to assume that in Washington they 
are innocently preoccupied with violations in the voting procedure. For the US admin­
istration it is not so very important who has won the elections - Marcos or Aqunio. The 
main thing is keeping US bases in this country. Reagan himself blurted this out while 
speaking at a news conference. It is impossible to lessen the significance of these bases not 
only for us, but for the Western world, he said. The Philippines without US bases - this is 
the nightmare haunting the White House.
(b) Editorial report:
The declaration of a state of emergency in the Philippines by President Marcos 
was reported from Manila by Tass which also said (in Russian for abroad 0450 and in 
English 0535 gmt 24 Feb 86) that Gen Fabian Ver had stated in a radio broadcast that 
the government troops were preparing for a new operation against the “insurgents” . A 
later Tass report from Manila said (in Russian for abroad 0838 and in English 0855 gmt 
24 Feb 86) that Enrile and Ramos had said they had received assurances of support from 
commanders of military districts, including Manila. At the same time, Tass reported, the 
Minister of Public Information had stated that the government of Ferdinand Marcos 
controlled the situation and Mrs Aquino had made a statement after being proclaimed 
head of a “transtitional government” , calling on her supporters to stage a massive 
demonstration in Manila. Also on 24th February, Moscow’s “World Service” said 
(0800 gmt) “the complex situation in the Philippines is aggravated by US military and 
political interference in the affairs of the country. The Pentagon has sent the flagship of 
the Seventh Fleet, Blue Ridge, and the aircraft carrier Midway to its coast and transferred 
marine units of the Rapid Deployment Force” .
An earlier Tass report from Manila had said (in Russian for abroad 1311 and in 
English 1601 gmt 23 Feb 86) that a “dense crowd, consisting of tens of thousands of 
supporters of C. Aquino” had encircled Camp Aquinaldo where troops led by Enrile and 
Ramos had taken cover. Outling the course of events, the report continued that the 
Philippines were “literally in the sights of the Pentagon” and had been “ flooded with 
various ‘advisers’ and ‘observers’ who, the local press believes, have been doing regular 
‘arm-twisting’. A special role has been assigned to P. Habib, special representative of 
R. Reagan, who has arrived in the Philippines, allegedly in a ‘peace-making mission’ but 
actually it is to exert crude pressure on that sovereign country” .
SWB SU/8192/A3/2 25 Feb «6
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